Winter 2013: PHL 2500, Contemporary Issues

M/W 10:30 to 11:50 (EN 2007)

Office Hours: M/W: 12-2:00

Books Ordered:

Plato, Timaeus (Penguin, ISBN: 978-0140455045)
Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of
Time (Penguin, ISBN: 978-0452296541)
Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (Norton Publishing, IBSN: 978-0393340587)


Jan. 7  Introduction to the Course

Jan. 9  Plato’s Timaeus (17a-31b)

Recommended: “Plato’s Timaeus,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Jan. 14 Plato’s Timaeus (31c-40d) [Melanie]

Jan.16 Aristotle, Physics, Book II (selections; concentrate on Sections 1-3); Book IV (read chapters 10-11) [Jessica C]

Recommended: Paul Nadal’s online commentary on Physics IV.

Jan. 21 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV (read chapters 12-14 [same file as above]). [Thom]

Jan. 23 Plotinus, selections from Enneads (III.7)[Mary]

Recommended: Gordon H. Clark, “The Theory of Time in Plotinus,” The Philosophical Review 53.4 (July, 1944): 337-358. [Access from on campus]

Jan. 28 Plotinus, selections from Enneads (III.7) [Rachel]

Jan. 30 Augustine, Confessions, Book XI (chapters 1-14) [Tricia]

Feb. 4  Augustine, Confessions, Book XI (chapters 15-end) [Travis]

Discussion Paper 1 Due (10 points): What is the eternal? Use three of the philosophers we have read to describe the eternal, utilizing precisely those passages wherein they define their usage of the word. Note any differences in the accounts among the three philosophers you have chosen. (Up to five pages, double-spaced)

Feb. 6  Clarke and Leibniz Correspondence  [Holley S.]

Podcast on Clarke-Leibniz to replace Feb. 6 class.

Feb. 13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason: Introduction, Section I, Section VII; “Transcendental Aesthetic” (concentrate on the section II on time).  [Thom [introductions]/Ryan M. [Transcendental Aesthetic]

Recommended: “Kant on Space and Time,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Feb. 18 Break

Feb. 20 Break

Feb. 25 Finish Kant on time.

David Couzens Hoy, Ch. 1Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality [Thom]

Feb. 27 Hoy, Ch. 2Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality [Chantel]

Martin Heidegger, “Lecture on the Concept of Time“ (first half) [Melanie]

Mar. 4  Heidegger, “Lecture on the Concept of Time (second half) [Tricia]

Mar. 6 Heidegger, selection from Being and Time [Emily O]

Mar. 11 Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here (Introduction, Part I: Chapters 1-3)/ [Leah A./ Alena Smith]

(See his interview here about the book)

Discussion Paper Due (10 pts.): What is the “now”? Using proper quotations from Aristotle’s Physics, tell me what Aristotle says about the “now” and its relation to time. Next, describe Heidegger’s own critique of the concept of the “now” as defining the essence of time. (up to four pages, double-spaced)

Mar. 13 Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here (Part Two) [Leah A.]

Mar. 18 Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here (Part IV) [Travis]

Mar. 20  Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (chapter 1) [Rachel] and chapter 2 (Jessica)

Mar. 25 Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (chapter 3) [Chantel]
Begin Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” pp. 1-20. [Mary]

Mar. 27 Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” pp. 20-end. [Emily O and Ryan]

Discussion Paper (10 points): In this paper you will compare the contemporary physics of time as presented in Sean Carroll’s From Eternity to Here and compare it to the thinking of time in one of the other authors we have read. How does relativity theory and/or quantum mechanics change our thinking of time?

Apr. 1 Parker English, “Kalumba, Mbiti, and a Traditional African Concept of Time” (Holley S.)

See also Peter Gratton, “What’s in a Name? African Philosophy in the Making”

Apr. 3  Course wrap-up.

April 15, 9:00 AM: Final Papers Due

27 thoughts on “Winter 2013: PHL 2500, Contemporary Issues

  1. Thank you Sir for this website>I was happy to hear today that this course doesnt require basic knowledge.I will get the text book sas fast as I can.

  2. Protocol for Plato’s Timaeus
    Melanie Greening

    • There is no evidence that proves Timaeus’ existence. Plato may have created Timaeus’ character after Archytas, whom Plato met in Sicily (Plato, 6).
    • The characters in Timaeus are: Timaeus(the main speaker), Socrates, Hermocrates, and Critias.
    • Introductory Conversation (a)- Socrates, Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates gather one day after Socrates creates the ideal city in dialectic, as in Plato’s Republic.
    • Socrates briefly summarizes the discussion of the ideal city, and Socrates emphasizes the importance that each member of the ideal city fulfills their natural roles, e.g. Guardians must be spirited and philosophical to ensure their success in protecting the city (Plato, 8).
    • Critias gives Solons account of the battle between Atlantis and Athens.
    • Solon heard of the battle from priests in Egypt, and the battle was written down eight thousand years after, thus relied on oral tradition beforehand.
    • Critias heard of the battle as a child when he was at Apatoria. Apatoria is named from the greek word “apate”, which means deceit (Plato, xiii).
    • Critias says that Atlantis was governed just like the ideal city that Socrates describes. A great flood destroyed the island of Atlantis and Athens (Plato, 14)
    • Timeaus describes being and becoming, as being is within the creator of the universe, and becoming is within the universe (Plato, 18).
    • “[…]It is in every way necessary that the world is a likeness of something” (Plato, 19).
    • Synonyms for the creator of the universe: The One, demiurge, God, the eternal being, the eternally unchanging, maker and father of the universe, eternal living being, etc.
    • aitia=cause, sunaitia=co-cause.
    • Is demiurge cause? Is the universe co-cause?
    • Synonyms for the universe: cosmos, heavens, world of becoming, world of change, sensible world, this world, etc.
    Main Section 1: The Work of Reason
    • Timaeus says the universe was created as an image of The One, and the universe was intended to be fair and good (Plato, 20)
    • Intelligence was placed in souls, and souls in bodies (Plato, 20).
    • The four bodies of the world are: earth, air, wind, and fire ( Plato, 21).
    • “So God placed water and air between fire and earth, and made them so far as possible bear the same proportion to each other[…]and in this way he bound heaven into a visible and tangible whole” (Plato, 22).
    • The universe is created into a sphere (Plato, 22).
    • The seven motions are: uniform circular motion in the same place, up, down, backwards, forwards, right, left.
    • The universe assumes the uniform circular motion.
    • The world soul was created first, and controls the body (Plato, 24).
    • Questions: What is “the circle of the different”?

    • The universe is modelled from the eternal being, but it was not possible to attribute eternity on the universe. “[…]but he determined to make a moving image of eternity, and so, when he orders the heavens, he makes in that when we call ‘time’ and eternal image, progressing according to number, of an eternity that rests in unity” (Plato, 27).
    • Time=“a moving image of eternity” (Plato, 27).
    • “The sun, the moon, and the five planets as they are called, have come into being to preserve the measures of time (Plato, 28).
    • For example: The earth orbits the sun, and the earth’s position in relation to the sun gives us seasons. Like Plato said, the motion of the earth gives us a concept of time in this way.

    Main Section II The Work of Necessity
    • Being, i.e. Form, and becoming, i.e. sensible object, are the first two factors introduced. The core where things come to be is called the receptacle. The receptacle is the third major factor, and is also called space. (Plato, 30).
    • “[…]it is necessary given its nature that the figure which has the fewest faces is the most mobile, as well as the sharpest and most penetrating, and finally, being composed of the smallest number of identical parts, the lightest” (Plato, 50).
    • Earth-cube(6sides), Fire-tetrahedron(4 sides), Air- octahedron(8sides), Water-icosahedron(20sides). The universe is represented by the figure dodecahedron (Plato, 49).
    • The unequal sizes of the triangles of the bodies allow for variation (Plato, 53)
    • For example: Mist is a variety of air, made up of unequal triangles (Plato, 53).
    • Varieties of water include liquid and the fusible, e.g. metals, most varieties of water are mixtures (Plato 54-54).
    • Tactile qualities are: hot, cold, hard, soft, heavy, light, smooth, rough, and we can account for these affections.
    • For example: Fire “cuts” our body, and we perceive the sharpness of the angles of the triangles that compose fire (Plato, 57).
    • This is pain. Softness, on the other hand is pleasure.
    • Pleasure is balance, and pain occurs when the balance is upset (Plato, 61)
    • Plato says diseases are a cause of imbalances of the four bodies, and the parts of the body, and the soul require balance for proper care as well (Plato, 79-86).

    • Am I missing any key points?

  3. Philosophy 2500 – Jessica Conrod January 16th 2013
    – “.. Begin by working out the difficulties connected with it [time]”
    “First does it belong to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist.. Second what is its nature?”
    – “One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality.”
    – “Further if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary that, when it exists, all or some of its parts must exist.”
    – “For the ‘now’ is not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which is made up of parts. Time.. is not made up of ‘nows’.”
    – “‘Now’ seems to bind past and future – does it remain the same or is it always other and other?”
    – “ If it is always different and different, and if none of the parts in time which are other and other are simultaneous (unless the one contains and the other is contained, as the shorter time is by the longer), and if the ‘now’ which is not, but formerly was, must have ceased to be at some time, the ‘nows’ too cannot be simultaneous with one another, but the prior ‘now’ must always have ceased to be. “
    What does this mean?
    – We may say that ‘now’ cannot be next to another ‘now’ with a different meaning if then it did not become the next ‘now’ but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the innumerable ‘nows’ between the two which is impossible.
    – “But also its impossible for ‘now’ to remain the same or nothing would be before or after anything else.”
    – “As to what time is or what is its nature, the traditional accounts give us a little light… that it is the movement of the whole… the sphere itself.”
    – Time is present equally everywhere and with all things… where change is faster or slower whereas time is not; fast and slow is defined by time.”
    – Does time exist without change?
    – “If any movement takes place in the mind we suppose that some time has elapsed… therefore time is either movement or something that belongs to movement.”
    – Movement goes with the magnitude [which is continuous] the movement too is continuous.”
    – “It is clear then that time is number of movement in respect of the before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous.”
    – “Time is not a number with which we count but the number of the things which are counted”
    – “Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other. ”
    – “To be in number means that there is a number of the thing, and that its being is measured by the number in which it is. Hence if a thing is in time it will be measured by time. But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one qua moved, the other qua at rest; for it will measure their motion and rest respectively”
    Qua = being?
    – “So one kind of ‘now’ is described in this way: another is when the time of something is near. “
    – “’At some time’ means a time determined in relation to the first of the two types of ‘now’, e.g. at some time Troy was taken, and at some time there will be a flood; for it must be determined with reference to the ‘now’. “
    – “’Just now’ refers to the part of future time which is near the indivisible present ‘now’ (When are you walking?—Just now; because the time in which he is going to do so is near), and to the part of past time which is not far from the ‘now’ (When are you walking?—I have been walking just now).”
    – ‘Lately’, if the time is near the existing now. ‘Long ago’ refers to the distant past.
    – ’Suddenly ’ refers to what has departed from its former condition in a time imperceptible because of its smallness; but it is the nature of all change to alter things from their former condition.
    – “Now there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion there is included circular movement, and everything is counted by some one thing homogeneous with it, units by a unit, horses by a horse, and similarly times by some definite time, and, as we said, time is measured by motion as well as motion by time.”
    – Locomotion = Movement or the ability to move from one place to another

  4. Enneads III.7 “On Time and Eternity”
    For my Handout, I covered points 7,8 and 9 of Plotinus’ writing.

    7. This part seems to be talking about the distinction between “Being in Time” and “Being in Eternity”. Plotinus starts to talk about how we must be connected to eternity in someway. but the problem is that if we are in Time, how are we connected/in contact to eternity.  This is how I think he tries to explain our contact with eternity while in time, but I’m not really sure what it means:
    “So, then, we must go down from eternity to the enquiry into time, and to time, for there our way led us upwards, but now we must come down in our discourse, not although, but in the way which time came down”. Time is a changing reality , while eternity is an unchanging reality.

    Furthermore, Plotinus decides that what it means to be in time and to be in eternity came to our knowledge when we discovered time.
    From there, I had no sweet clue about what he was talking about until he started talking about how we identify Time with Movement because it cannot be with something that is at rest since Time is mainly concerned with change. An object that is resting is obviously not changing. He continues to discuss the types of movement people try to identify time with:
    – some mean that it is all movement

    -some say it’s the movement of the universe

    -something belonging to movement

    -the distance covered by movement

    -it is the consequence of movement

    -off all movement (which seems to be the same as the first type of movement discussed)

    – and finally only of ordered movement (no idea what ordered movement is)

    8. Continuing into 8, Plotinus says that movement cannot possibly be time, whether all the movements listed above become one movement or it’s an ordered movement because movement is in time. Furthermore, he discusses that movement can come to rest or be interrupted, whereas time cannot be. Also, he talks about whether the movement of the universe:
    “If someone says that the movement of the universe is not interrupter, this, too (if he means the circuit of the heavens), is in a period of time; and it would do round to the same point not in time in which half its course was finished, and one would be half, the other double time; each movement would be movement of the universe, one going from the same place to the same place again, and the other reaching the half way point.”
    I need some explanation on this because I did not quite understand what it meant. But from what I understood, he ruled this type of movement out of being in connection with time. so, maybe it is to be an extent or duration of Movement.
    Plotinus continues to talk about movement. He asks if Time is something belonging to movement: “If it is the distance covered by the movement, first, this is to the same for all movement, not even uniform movement, for the movement is quicker and slower, even movement in space”.
    Throughout most of his writing of movement, I had difficulty trying to figure out what he was talking about. Therefore, further explanation of part 8 would be helpful.

    -If he already ruled out movement in relation to time, why and what is he trying to figure out through this whole section?

    -is Time the measure of any and every Movement?

    9. “We must now enquire in what sense it is the number of movement or measure- for it is better to call it measure of movement, since movement is continuous.” What is Number of Movement?
    Further down in the section, Plotinus makes a point that I found to be intriguing, if time is endless and continuing, how can you apply a number to it, or a measurement? The thought of something being endless and it’s search for the beginning made me think of Aristotle’s theory for what caused the world. Maybe people did not actually create time and like Aristotle’s theory, a one being created it, like a chain reaction.

    From reading Plotinus’ work, I wonder why Time has to be relevant to movement at all. Why can’t Time just be a measure of it’s own. Would it be fair to say that Time would not exist if human’s had not of created it? And if we did create it, would it not have it’s own definition aside from movement? I found this piece of writing to be difficult to follow and inconclusive on my part. I am interested to see what everyone else has gathered from it to further my understanding.

  5. Mary Germaine
    Enneads III.7 Plotinus on Eternity

    Plotinus begins his discussion by differentiating eternity and time: time is a sphere of change and of universe we live in and eternity is the unchanging world that “lasts forever” (297). Plotinus is quick to modify his position by suggesting that while it seems we understand time and eternity, since we speak of them and experience them (I am not sure how, exactly), but in trying to examine these two concepts, it is obvious we do not have a clear definition of either.
    Plotinus further differentiates time and eternity by echoing Plato’s argument that eternity is an archetype and that time is an image of this archetype, that is to say, an imitation of eternity.

    In trying to give an account for eternity, Plotinus asks several questions:

    Is eternity comparable to intelligible substance? How?
    Firstly, intelligible refers to anything perceived by the mind. Substance is generally considered any thing, which means it has a material existence. However, in this writing it seems to make the most sense to think that Plotinus is speaking of form when he says intelligible substance.
    Eternity seems to be intelligible substance because we think of eternity as “majestic” (299) and intelligible substance is the most majestic thing ever.
    However, intelligible substance exists in the sphere of eternity, which means they cannot be the same thing. Further, the intelligible world has things in it as parts, whereas eternity can only contain whole things in it. (Nothing is partially eternal.)

    Is eternity related to rest the way time is to motion?
    (Is he referencing Aristotle’s position that time is the measure of motion?)
    One problem with eternity as a way of understanding rest is that eternity is completely one, but rest is made of parts, since it exists only in relation to motion.
    Another issue with this is rest, that is the privation of movement, is a quality of eternity. Rest is implicit in eternity, so the argument that eternity is rest is not explaining anything.

    How does eternity relate to everlastingness? Are they the same thing? Is one predicable of the other?
    Plotinus asks whether everlastingness is unification; he calls it a “unity from many sources” (303). (I am not sure what the sources would be—the forms, I guess.) Nevertheless, it is important to note that if this is the case, then everlastingness is dependent on its subjects or “sources”. (Wouldn’t it?)
    Plotinus argues that while eternity is/has this feature (everlastingness), it also is/has other features: substance, motion, rest, the other, the same, etc. He describes “compressing the otherness in these intelligible realities” (303) into one reality: life. Plotinus seems to mean eternity exists as the big picture of all the other substances together. However, this does not mean that eternity consists of these substances, because that would imply that it is a whole made of parts.

    Plotinus argues contrary to Aristotle and posits that eternity is not the substratum. (Is that because a substratum implies priority and for Plotinus even logical priority contradicts the timelessness of eternity? Is it the case that if eternity is the substratum, then it would be a part and not the whole universe?)

    The key conclusion of these three questions is that eternity is completely one. This oneness proves that eternity always exists in the present. (I find this confusing—the present seems to exist in time, and therefore in relation to past and future. Why does not eternity exist outside of time entirely?)
    Since eternity is complete, there is nothing it could need. Therefore, there is nothing it had and no longer has nor is there anything it will have that it does not have now. This seems to reflect Aristotle’s notion that time measures motion or change. Without any changes, there is no need for time.

    Unlike the eternal world, Plotinus argues that our universe moves circularly and does so because it has a future. It is motivated by an “aspiration” to be everlasting (309). Plotinus calls this the “’cause’ of the movement of the universe” (309). (Does he mean the universe’s telos is to become eternal?)
    The soul moves in a similar manner. This foreshadows his argument that the activity of the soul is to contemplate eternity (“the One”).

    At the end of section 5, Plotinus posits that the definition of eternity as “a life which is here and now endless because it is total and expends nothing of itself, since it has no past or future” (313) is very close to accurate, which echoes Plato’s position in the Timaeus that we cannot give a complete account of eternity.

  6. Augustine – Confessions (Book 11; Chapter 13)

    At the beginning of Book 11, Augustine dives deep into a discussion of the Genesis and how the world came to be. Although Augustine relies heavily on the validity and truth of the biblical narrative he turns to God once again as he does throughout his entire text; the Confessions and questions specific issues that he comes across. He directly questions the creation of the world, the temporal process in comparison to the eternal and essentially how God came to the sudden creation of the earth.

    God who is eternal unlike all that is temporal created the world through his “word” which is not literally a form of speech but the way he created the world eternally. Augustine understands the temporality of the earth and all the entities that make it a whole – as a whole, the world encompasses change and motion but it is HOW and WHEN the earth came to exist that puzzles Augustine. Augustine agrees that there had to have been a Creator of the earth and that Creator is God, it is impossible for earth to have been created by itself or to have come into existence by self-generation and it is also impossible for the earth to be deemed eternal as it undergoes many forms of change, variation and motion – all things that do not define eternity.

    Augustine is not saying that the earth was literally or physically created by God, it is impossible that anything existed before the creation of the world so God had to have created the earth in some other way than by the means of physical space – he did so through his “word” meaning the creation of the world was not through actual speech but was brought to exist through the unchanging God as a sudden and eternal creation. There is no actual time that the universe was created because God and his creation cannot be defined by time.

    For Augustine, God had to have created the world at some point in some way, but from something that has never previously existed. Augustine must decipher when time started and how God is related to time. For Augustine, time and God exist individually (separately) therefore all entities that are exist, exist solely through God’s creation simultaneously with time; time and creation exist in “cotemporal”.

    Augustine talks about the “beginning”, for him the “beginning” is not defined by time (once again God is entirely separate from time) but it is the starting point for the world as a whole. The “beginning” is the source and initial cause of the world which is forever unchanging. Augustine explains that it is impossible to compare the eternal and the temporal process in the world because they lack the common qualities that are necessary for comparison.

    Augustine uses the example of a “long time”, a “long time” does not become long and is not eternally long it is the many “now’s” or moments that pass in succession (which cannot be simultaneous with one another) which defines a time as long. Most importantly for Augustine, God exists separately from time and there is no possible existence in time before God who is constantly and forever in the present eternally.

    (Quote from Chapter 13)

    “In the Eternal, on the other hand, nothing passes away, but the whole is simultaneously present.”

    – The Eternal for Augustine, is an entity or what he refers to as a “whole” that occurs all at once in the “now” or present simultaneously, there is no past and there is no future, eternity is essentially everlasting. There is no part of the Eternal that comes or goes nor involves a definite start or an end, the eternal is continuous forever.

    “But no temporal process is wholly simultaneous. Therefore, let it431 see that all time past is forced to move on by the incoming future; that all the future follows from the past; and that all, past and future, is created and issues out of that which is forever present.”

    – Here Augustine is arguing that no existing entity or event in the world is constantly in the present, each and every entity, event or “whole” temporally in the world endures some type of change, variation and motion. An event or “temporal process” that has already occurred is considered to be in the past as it has pushed forward by the future which is inevitable in time signifying a time that has past. Therefore the temporal process that continues after the time in the past is deemed as the future which always proceeds the past. Conclusively, Augustine coins time as eternal, time is everlasting and goes forward and backwards forever, but time is what creates and generates these points of the past and future which define the world as a whole and are defined by time.

    “Who will hold the heart of man that it may stand still and see how the eternity which always stands still is itself neither future nor past but expresses itself in the times that are future and past? Can my hand do this, or can the hand of my mouth bring about so difficult a thing even by persuasion?”

    – At this point, I am really unsure of what he is trying to explain or what point he is getting at. Is he trying to question how we measure the present or what the present is – what do you think?

  7. Chapters XV-end

    XV- He seems to ramble on and repeat himself about the influence of the present and how we can or cannot measure time. He claims that past and future cannot be measured as “long” because they don’t exist. So what can be measured? The present? How long is the present until it becomes the past. He claims if the present becomes “the most minute momentary point, this alone is what we may call time present.” He then runs into the problem that if that is extended it becomes past or future, ceases to exist and finally says that the present has no extension whatsoever.

    XVI/XVII- He now considers that the past does in fact exist otherwise how would we give an account of what. He’s still having trouble with the thought of measuring time itself, and what would represent a “long time.”

    XVIII/XIX- He dismisses the idea of psychics as he claims the future does not exist. But he says, that basically, present events allow for the prediction of future events. What exists now, can give us hints to the future, which does not yet exist. ex: “I see the dawn; I predict that the sun is about to rise.”

    XX- Past= memory Present=direct experience Future=expectations. “There are three times, past, present, and future.” I shall not be troubled by it, nor argue, nor object.”

    XXI-He goes back to his problem of what time is measured by such as in chapter XV.

    XXIII- Makes several references to the suns revolution around the earth and the importance of what we call a “day.” He poses the question, if the sun stopped revolving or sped up or slowed down, would this impact our “day.” If the sun completed its rotation in 12 hours, would or definition of a day be any different?

    XXIV/XXVI- time is not motion of the body. “how long” is simply a phrase in which we compare one time or distance to another, but time is not motion. Should we measure time by longer and shorter comparisons, etc… This syllable is longer then that? He asks what aspect of time is he actually measuring? Past, present or future?

    XXVII- honestly this chapter made my brain hurt and I struggle to understand what he’s getting at. What I took out of it- Perhaps time is measurable because the present does pass instantaneously, but it is also followed by a constant “next present” and this in essence, continues the present as the previous one becomes past?

    XXVIII- “…unless it is that in the mind in which all this happens there are three functions? For the mind expects, it attends, and it remembers; so that what it expects passes into what it remembers by way of what it attends to.” As future expectations draw closer and are attended to, the past of memories grows larger until that future is exhausted. Is he simplifying the procession of time?

  8. Holley Skinner ( Clarke and Leibniz Correspondence – first paper, first reply, second paper and second reply)

    Leibniz’s first paper

    I. He says the religion seems to be in great decline
    In England – Many people believe that human souls are made up of matter and that God is a corporeal being

    II. Locke : Not sure if the soul is material and naturally perishable

    III. Newton said that space is like a sense organ used by God to sense things. “But if God needs an organ to sense things by, it follows that they don’t depend entirely on him and weren’t produced by him.”

    IV. Newton and his followers opinion on God’s workmanship:
    God’s watch – the universe – would stop working if he didn’t rewind it from time to time! He didn’t have enough foresight to give it perpetual motion. This machine that he has made is so imperfect that from time to time he has to clean it by a miraculous intervention, and even has to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work.

    Here by ‘clean up’ is he referring to destruction? Katrina, WWI & WWII etc..?

    Leibniz believes the world always contains the same amount of force and energy.
    He then goes on to basically say if you think God works miracles to meet the needs of nature then you’re wrong and that you look meanly on to God

    Clarke’s first reply

    I. It’s not just the people in England who reject natural religion, this is due to “the false philosophy of the materialists – a philosophy that clashes more directly than any other with the mathematical principles of philosophy.”

    Those who believe that souls of humans are bodies and the same for God himself are enemies of the mathematical principles of philosophy. The principles prove that body is the smallest and most inconsiderable part of the universe.

    II. Locke did imply that he wasn’t certain if the human soul was immaterial or not. His only followers were enemies to the mathematical principles of philosophy who only except Locke’s errors.

    III. Newton doesn’t say that space is an organ used by God. He believes God to be present everywhere

    God perceives all things because he is present to them
    Its like when our grandmothers say God is always with you

    IV. The world was made and needs no tinkering, and God need only place ‘weights’ and ‘springs’ for adjusting or putting together certain moving parts

    Leibniz’s second paper

    I. believes the mathematical principles of philosophy are the same as materialists with one difference
    The materialists who follow Democritus, Epicurus and Hobbes combine themselves altogether to mathematical principles and hold that nothing exists but bodies; whereas the Christian mathematicians [I.e. Newton and his followers] allow that there are also immaterial substances.
    Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle had knowledge of metaphysical principles
    “The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or identity, I.e. that a proposition cant be true and false at the same time, so that A is A and cant be not A.”
    “for anything that is the case there’s a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise.”
    Principles of natural philosophy that don’t depend on mathematics (dynamic principles I.e, the principles of force)

    II. Newton admits empty space and matter and says that matter fills up a small part of space

    Democritus and Epicurus believed there to be more matter in the universe than Newton allowed
    More matter = more opportunity God has to exercise his power and wisdom.
    Believed there is no empty space at all

    III. Newton: space is the sensorium of God

    ‘Sensorium’ = organ of sensation

    IV. “Clarke supposes that the mere presence of the soul is sufficient to make it aware of what happens in the brain.”

    “For x to represent what happens in y, mere presence isn’t enough; there has to be something that explains what x and y have to do with one another—either •one acts on the other, or both are acted on by a single cause.”

    V. God is aware of all that goes on because of his presence and his activity, he preserves things by producing whatever is good and perfect, he knows what he’s doing.

    VI & VII. God is infinitely superior to man
    “Those who think otherwise—acknowledging the power but not properly admitting the wisdom of the source of things—will fall into exactly the same error as the materialists and Spinoza, though they try to keep them at arms’ length.”

    VIII & IX talks about how God is the creator and he has great wisdom and power

    X. God is not apart of this world we live in

    XI. God continually preserves everything and nothing can exist without him

    XII. “If God has to mend the course of nature from time to time, he must do it either supernaturally or naturally.”

    Clarke’s Second Reply (it’s at this point where they start acting extremely childish and bicker back and forth)

    I. “Materialists think that the whole order of nature could have arisen from mere mechanical principles of matter and motion, acting blindly and inevitably. The mathematical principles of philosophy show that, on the contrary, the state of things (the constitution of the sun and planets) must have had a cause that was acting thoughtfully and freely.”

    “consider two material things (particles or complexes) that are exactly alike and are of course in different places. Why are they situated as they are rather than the other way around? Why is x here and y there, rather than y here and x there? So far as bits of matter are concerned, one place is the same as another, so that if the locations of x and y had been switched it would have been exactly the same thing”
    “Even if there isn’t much matter, that doesn’t reduce God’s scope for exercising his wisdom and power, because he can act wisely and powerfully on things other than matter.”

    III. The word ‘sensorium’, used properly, refers not to the organ of sensation but to the place of sensation.

    IV. Necessary for soul to be there to perceive things, it’s not the only thing however

    V. God is a “living, thinking thing as well as an omnipresent one.”

    X. “God is neither a mundane intelligence, nor a supramundane intelligence. He is an omnipresent intelligence, both inside the world and outside of it. He is in all, and through all, as well as being above all.”

    XII. “Leibniz’s argument in this paragraph presupposes that everything that God does is supernatural or miraculous; so what it’s aiming at is to exclude all activity by God in governing and ordering the natural world. In fact, though, the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ doesn’t exist from God’s standpoint; all it marks is a difference between two ways that we have of thinking about things. Causing the sun or the earth to move regularly is something we call ‘natural’: stopping its motion for a day we would call ‘supernatural’; but neither of these needs more power than the other, and from God’s standpoint neither is more or less natural or supernatural than the other. God’s being present in the world, or to the world, doesn’t make him the soul of the world.3 A soul is part of a compound, the other part being a body, and they affect each other as parts of the same whole. But God is present to the world not as a •part but as •a governor; acting on everything and not acted on by anything. He is not far from every one of us, for in him we and all things live and move and have our beings.”

  9. Section VII

    • Starts by saying that reasons are upon which we bare principles of understanding and therefore pure reason contains principles of cognition.

    • Then says anything pure must not be or never had been mixed with anything extraneous.

    • This is what’s needed to make cognition and absolute priori.

    • Here, I think it says that a pure reason would be a collection of principles upon a priori cognition could be conceived.

    • But then says that a furnished system of pure reason is asking a lot and that it may not be possible at all.

    • Then goes on to say the science of pure reason is only scratching the surface and couldn’t possibly be a doctrine. Its only gain would be to keep reason free from error and purify it, not expand.

    • Then it’s discussed that transcendental philosophy is but a system that once again is too much for us yet, being only at the beginning. Also says that such a science would be comprised of analytic cognition and synthetic a priori cognition.

    • This at most can only be called a transcendental critique because it only corrects the cognitions themselves???

    • Does not understand the next six lines….

    • Goes into saying that the system of philosophy of pure reason is possible to complete, within a certain set of boundaries.

    • Also says that what constitutes an object is not the nature of things but our understanding of the nature of things.

    • Not confident, but I believe it then says that no one should expect here, a critique of reason, but rather a critique over our power. If no critique was present, judgment would be baselessly passed on by judges and unqualified historians.

    • Then proceeds to stress that Transcendental Philosophy is not a critique of pure reason, but an architectural outline of the system. A system of all principles of pure reason.

    • A distinction is then made between the critique and Transcendental Philosophy by the critique being without a comprehensive analysis or the complete review of these concepts.

    • Reasons for this are 1. A dissection of concepts would be useless in its lack of “precariousness” which is found in synthesis. 2. That taking responsibility for the completeness of such analysis and derivation would go against the unity of our plan.

    • Also doesn’t understand the end of this paragraph. I’m really trying.

    • But in a way the critique does make up Transcendental Philosophy but is not yet a science because it only goes far enough to make a complete judgment about synthetic a priori cognition.

    • The foremost goal is a pure understanding of the priori cognition in the science.

    • Then says that Transcendental Philosophy is a philosophy of merely speculative pure reason. For everything with incentive and feeling simply belongs to empirical sources.

    • The division of science being put forth now must first contain in the first place a doctrine of elements and a doctrine method. These would be subdivided but the bases on which we would do so has yet to be established.

    • Goes on then to say the human mental processes is made of both sensibility and understanding.

    • We first sense something given to us, then it is thought of. This means the transcendental sense would belong to the first set of elements.

    The end, did i leave any key points out???

  10. I. On the Distinction between Pure and Empirical Cognition

    In this section, or rather the introduction, Kant begins with the premise that all cogntion begins with experience. That is to say our sensory perception is the beginning of our cognition, and the raw data (for lack of a better term) formulates our experiences. Kant briefly mentions time here by stating that “no cognition in us precedes experience, and all our cognition begins with experience”. Continuing on from that, Kant clarifies that while all of our cognition start with experience, it does not mean that all of our cognitions arise from experience. To simplify, he simply means that while all of our cognitions can be derived from experience we have the ability to utilize past experiences to formulate cognitions without an experience prompting it. Thus our experiences provide a composite of data and we have the cognitive power to combine experiences mentally (internally, without external sensory perception needed). (????)

    Kant then introduces a priori and a posteriori. A priori cognitions are characterized by universality and intrinsic necessity, and must be independent of experience. A posteriori are cognitions which borrow solely from experience, or derived empirically. Kant continues and states that “even among our experiences there is an admixture of cognitions that must originate a priori, and that serve perhaps only to give coherence to our presentation of the senses, there still remain certain original concepts … that must have arisen a priori, independently from experience”.

    Kant then raises the question, “is there such a cognition that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses”? Can we have a truly a priori cognition?Kant raises the point that we can have thoughts without necessarily taking from experience, however these are still derived from a universal rule which is in itself a posteriori. If a builder constructs a house with a weak foundation we know through derivation from our experience that the house will cave in, we do not need to see the house collapse to form this cognition.

    Question: Do we still need to see the house fall in order to validate the composite of cognitions we formulated a priori?

    I begin to lose Kant’s train of thought here as he attempts to determine if a pure a priori cognition is even possible. He uses the statement “every change has its cause” to illustrate an a priori cognition however it is not pure as the concept of change has to be derived from experience. A priori it seems as Kant puts it as a thought or cognition which can be made from pure reason, however our reasoning is based on experiences thus these a priori concepts are not pure by nature.

    II. We Are in Possession of Certain A Priori Cognitions, and Even Common Understanding is Never without Them.

    Kant raises another question, what characteristics exists to distinguish a pure cognition from an empirical one? He follows this with experience teaches us that something is but not that it cannot be otherwise. I’m not 100% on what he means by this statement. He does continue and offers two characteristics of pure cognition.


    1. if we find a proposition such that in thinking it we think at the same time its necessity, then it is an a priori judgment; and if, in ad­dition, it is not derived from any proposition except one that itself has the validity of a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. (What? does this mean it must be both the be pure?)
    2. Experience never provides absolute universal truths, rather, through induction we can assume that it is valid up until now. However we cannot say that it is absolute because our experience is limited.

    Hence necessity and strict universality are safe indicators of a priori cognition, and they do more­ over belong together inseparably. I think the easiest way to understand this is that a priori is a cognition of pure reason, such as if Jon ran 5 miles straight then he must have also ran 4 miles. It is a necessity and must apply all the that Jon ran 4 miles before he can run for 5 for this statement to be true. Thus it is a necessity and universal.

    Kant uses “all change must have cause” to prove this point. It is impossible for change to occur without cause thus this concept is necessary and must always apply. This statement however seems to contradict his definitions of a priori and a posteriori, at least to me. In order to know that change must have cause we must first experience this reaction, so wouldn’t this then become what Kant labels as an empirical universality and not a true a priori cognition?

    III. Philosophy Needs a Science That Will Determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Range of All A Priori Cognitions.

    In this section Kant really begins to work himself into a circle it seems. Kant begins with stating that cognitions which leave the realm of all possible experiences exist, They “exist beyond all bounds of experience” as he puts it. In these beyond existence cognitions, our experiences cannot provide us with any guide or correction. These are superior in importance over other experiences which can be derived from the realm of appearances. However there exist problems of reason which are unavoidable, these are God, freedom, immortality. (What does he mean by this?) However Metaphysics is the science whose aim is to solve these problems.

    Kant suggests that if we leave realm of experience, we would erect an edifice (conceptual structure) for us to base our reasoning. We wouldn’t erect this edifice on unfamiliar principles simply because we would not be able to continue reasoning.

    After this I am lost on what Kant is trying to convey, in this section, with regards to natural. Is he suggesting that it is only natural we base our edifice on familiar principles? He then states that beyond the realm of experience we cannot be refuted by experience, the appeal of expanding cognition is so great that only clear contradictions will prevent a continuation of reason. This contradiction can be avoided by being cautious in our “inventions”.

    Mathematics provides the realm for this to situation to exist, mathematics is the edifice upon which we base all reason. The interaction of numbers is pure such that it is universally true and possess an innate necessity, without these mathematics would fail to be pure. Plato left the world of sense due to its narrow limits on understanding, he ventured into a realm of pure understanding. Kant states that he made no headway because he had no foothold, resting point, to set understanding in motion. He lacked a foundation upon which to build.

    Kant states that this is common in human reasoning. Not to enquire as to the validity or structural integrity upon which reason was based. If a house is based on a weak foundation it will not stand the test of time, much like reason. If formed on a weak foundation, the reason will lack truth (Once again he lost me).Kant then explains what keeps us from inspecting our foundation. I must admit he lost me here too, and I’m not 100% on what he is trying to convey.

    IV. On the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgements

    In this section Kant identifies two categories of judgements, Analytical and Synthetic.

    Analytical Judgements are, in Kant’s wording, a judgement where the predicate belongs to the subject as something that is contained in this concept. Synthetic Judgements are, once again in Kant’s elegant wording, a judgement where the predicate, though connected with the concept, lies quite outside it.

    To further elaborate:

    Analytical Judgement: All triangles have three sides.
    The subject would be ‘triangle’ and predicate being that they have ‘three sides’. Kant states that these judgements are ‘elucidatory’ or can be explained within themselves. The predicate does not add to the subject, only dissect the subject breaking it up into components of itself. Triangles by nature have three sides, this doesn’t expand on triangles, only further describes what is already known.

    Synthetic Judgement: All bodies are heavy
    Kant calls synthetic judgements expansive, because they add to the concept of the subject which is not a property of that concept at all. For example, “all bodies are heavy”. Bodies would be the subject and the predicate that they are heavy is not a concept which is already contained within body, rather this predicate is in addition to the subject. Heavy is not a characteristic of all bodies.

  11. Protocol on Martin Heidegger’s Lecture on the Concept of Time (pgs: 1-15)
    Melanie Greening

    Heidegger begins his Lecture on the Concept of Time with a discussion of eternity: “If eternity were something other than the empty state of perpetual being, the dei, if God were eternity, then the way of contemplating time initially suggested would necessarily remain in a state of perplexity so long as it knows nothing of God, and fails to understand the inquiry concerning him” (2). This shows Heidegger’s definition of eternity as: “the empty state of perpetual being, the dei.” Heidgeger also argues that if an understanding of God as eternity is based on faith that he exists, time cannot be understood in terms of faith in eternity: “we will never be able to employ eternity methodologically as a possible respect in which to discuss time” (2). Heidegger describes time as being a part of human existence, as he says time is “a mere derivative of being temporal”(2).
    Heidegger introduces his conceptual method as pre-science. He gives a benefit for using the pre-scientific method: “It lets us know when a particular piece of research is directly concerned with its matter, or when it feeds on a traditional and hackneyed verbal knowledge of it” (3). Heidegger will use this pre-scientific method to distinguish between faith that the eternal exists, and his understanding of time.
    Relativity Theory
    Heidegger mentions that Einstein’s Relativity Theory was the most current research on time during his writing of his Lecture on the Concept of time in 1924. Relativity Theory proposes that space and time are nothing in themselves, but they exist because things exist in space and events (change, change of place, locomotion) occur in time. There is neither absolute space, or time, and no simultaneity of “nows” (4). This theory says that observed time/space interactions, e.g. aging, movement, and velocity are RELATIVE to the observer. Since people exist in different locations in space, what one observer sees another person doing, e.g. the person walks 3 mph north, and the observer walks 3 mph south. The observer sees the person’s velocity as 6 mph north because space and time are always relative to the observer.
    Heidegger uses the example of a clocks cyclical repetition to explain that clocks measures the duration of time of a specific event, from the beginning now-point to the end now-point: “Each earlier and later can be determined in terms of a now which, however, is itself arbitrary”(6). Any “now-point” in time, e.g. 12 o’clock, has no greater value over another “now-point”. All “now-points” that we state are homogenous. Now is the present moment, and now-point refers to a specific moment in the past, present, or it can also refer to the present moment. Time is used in the mind for an organizational convenience of events, e.g. what now-point is convenient for two people to meet for lunch.
    “Am I the now, is every other person the now?” (6). I’m pretty sure that Heidegger is thinking that time exists because people are consciously aware of their own existence (“Being in time”). Time is used by people to communicate with each other, and without people there would be no time: “And in our being with one another we would be time- everyone and no one” (6).

    Just when I thought I had this sorted out, Heidegger questions whether time creates self-awareness or whether human beings are the cause of any perception of time: “Am I myself the now and my existence time? Or is it ultimately time itself that procures for itself the clock in us?”(6).
    Heidegger introduces Dasein on page 8 of his lecture: “If human Being is in time in a distinctive sense, so that we can read off from it what time is, then we must characterize this Dasein in the fundamental determinations of its Being”. For Heidegger, like the other philosopher’s we have studied, Dasein is “governed by the ‘One’, by tradition”(10). Dasein is the vantage point for how people perceive their past, present, and their future. The future of one’s Dasein is the “possibility of being”(14).
    Dasein is unique to humans. It means human existence, or human life. Heidegger lists several characteristics to elaborate on Dasein. For instance, it requires a conscious awareness of, or concern for, the daily events that surround a person. For example, as I’m writing this, I am aware of my concern for understanding this unfamiliar word Dasein. Also, it requires someone to have a concern for other people, and they can interact with others in Dasein. Heidegger shows that each individual has a unique Dasein: “If this entity is to be determined in its ontological character, then we must not abstract from its specificity as in each case mine. Mea res agitur”(9). For example, by communicating with another person, you will be able to compare your Dasein to theres. And by self-reflection you can determine that a range of differences may exist between your Dasein, and that of the other people in your life. Heidegger uses the obvious example of speaking for how two people comminute their individual Daseins with each other. Interrelationships are an important factor for understanding the characteristics of Dasein, and Heidegger calls this: “being with one another”. Further, the ability of humans to confirm their existence is necessary to be in Dasein. For example, people can confirm Dasein by saying: “I am “, and “I never am the Other”(11). Heidegger calls your specific Dasein: “being it”. Lastly, Dasein is not limited by cognition: “[Dasein is]grounded in a fundamental possibility of its Being” (11).
    “To have no time means to cast time into the bad present of the everyday. Being futural gives time, cultivates the present and allows the past to be repeated in how it is lived”(15).
    This notion of having no time describes a busy schedule, as the person tries to keep up with the various now-points they have designated for their days events. A person who considers keeping up with the fast paced modern world as most important is in the “bad” present of the everyday. When someone is being futural they are considering their past experiences, and living on accordingly. With this perspective, a person “gives time” for the good, and lives in respect to the good experiences from their past.

    Heidegger explains three different view-points for thinking about time: time in everydayness, time in nature, and world-time.
    What is the difference between these three? And what does Heidegger mean by:“No one is himself in everydayness”(9).

  12. Heidegger Handout (Pages 15-22)

    Heidegger continues to pursue the notion of time, the role of the Dasein and the relation to time. By questioning ‘how much of time’ means two things for Heidegger: we are not only taking time as the ‘now’ of the present, but we are also primarily concerned with something or some ‘what’ that is present. The Dasein is that which is present and that which we are primarily concerned with. Everything that occurs in the world (events, changes, movement, etc.) is encountered by the Dasein as existing in the ‘now’ of the present.

    Heidegger explains that because we bring time into the question of ‘how long’ – time can become long, time can become empty and time can become hard to fill. According to Heidegger things that happen in the world that are encountered by time as occurring in the present is known as ‘everydayness’. ‘Everydayness’ is shaped by the ‘now’, the now is endlessly revisited because we generate our daily life events in the world by saying “now, from now till then, till the next now” (17).

    Heidegger explains that in ‘everydayness’ the Dasein is the Being that one is, meaning the natural order in the world is universal for everyone and is not unique to just some. Time is what brings order and organization to the ‘everydayness’ in which the Dasein endures. To exemplify this point even further he illustrates time as universal, “the clock that one has, every clock, shows the time of being-with-one-another-in-the-world”, in other words time categorizes and brings order to all that the Dasein encounters.

    In order to measure time according to Heidegger, we must first and inevitably bring time into the question of ‘how much’. For example, a person who has just gotten out of bed for the day is trying to decide at what time in the day they will take their lunch break; they do so by choosing a point in the day which is determined by a clock. The person is essentially measuring ‘how long’ they will have to wait (how much time will have to pass) to reach the now-point in which they have established by time or a clock. He explains that “time made accessible by a clock is regarded as the present” and there is no clock that can ever possibly show neither the future nor the past (17).

    Heidegger interprets the nature of time in and defines each dimention:
    – time is the present
    – the past that is no longer the future and
    – the past is also irretrievable a
    – the future that is not yet present
    – the future is also indeterminate

    ‘Everydayness’ for Heidegger is the occurrences, events and happenings in nature and in the world that are constantly encountered on a daily basis as “occurring and existing” in the present (18). The sequence that events run through the present is a sequence that is both directionally singular and irreversible (I think here time is illustrated by Heidegger in a similar way that Aristotle portrayed time in his Physics). The Dasein unifies time by conscientiously considering their past while reaching out towards their future adjusting their present actions accordingly.

    Ultimately, Heidegger argues for an underlying explanation of what brings order to and establishes the existence of the Dasein; this underlying explanation for the unity of the Dasein is temporality. The Dasein is established in temporality and is constantly in the present considering the past while moving forward, the past is what shapes and guides the Dasein to move forward in the future accordingly. Heidegger explains his model of time as one is understood in itself and is made up of three different aspects or dimensions: the past, present and future. It is the Dasein that unifies these three dimensions of time as a whole, as Heidegger claims earlier, “Dasein in the whole of time” (16). One of the most important points that Heidegger is “Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but temporality” essentially I think Heidegger is saying that WE as temporal beings in the world (or the Dasein) unify the dimensions of time and time is what allows us to establish order in the world. The Being of Dasein is foundational and rooted in temporality.

  13. Heidegger- Selection from being in time

    In this reading Heidegger explains temporality as the “ontological meaning of care”, he discusses a connection between care and “selfhood”. He also goes on to discuss his meaning of “meaning”. He states characterizing the connection will be the final preparation to grasping phenomenally Dasein’s structural whole.
    -meaning is built from the ground of possibility of something and therefore meaning is built from the Being of something meaning that in order to have meaning it must be accessible in its Being.
    -meaning signifies the “upon which”
    -This Being is exhibited as Care
    – “to set forth the meaning of care means, then, to follow up the projection which guides and underlies the primordial existential Interpretation of Dasein, and to follow it up in such a way that in what is here projected, its “upon which” may be seen.”
    – what was projected for “Care” is the Being of Dasein
    -all ontical experience of entities is based of the projections of the Being of the corresponding entities. In these projections there lies a hidden “upon which” on this the understanding of the being nourishes itself. If we say these entities “have meaning” then it signifies that it has become accessible in their being.
    -“entities have meaning only because, as a Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being” (in terms of the upon-which of that projection)
    -“The question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the “upon which” of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities”
    -Dasein understands itself in such a way that the understanding is not just a grasp but rather “makes up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-for-Being”
    -“The meaning of this Being- that is, of care- is what makes care possible in this Constitution; and it is what makes up primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-Being.”
    -Dasein’s Beivg is a self-understanding of Daesin
    -Anticipatory resoluteness is being towards one’s ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being
    -Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of the future as coming towards, or a being-towards-death. This possible only as something futural (the coming in which Dasein comes toward itself, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being) Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural (anticipating future)
    -“Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty” (it already was) as authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as “having been” (recalling past)
    -“Resolute Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation- that is to say, taking action in such a way as to let on encounter was has presence environmentally- is possible only by making such an entity present.”
    -“This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate its as “temporality””
    -“Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care”
    -“Dasein’s totality of being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in as Being-alongside”
    -Care runs in time
    -Care is based on the character of having been
    -We call an entity past when it is no longer present-at-hand
    -As long as Dasein factically exists it is never past but it has been and only as long as Dasein exist can it have been
    -“Dasein, in existing, can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing way “in the course of time”, with a bit of it past already”
    -“In the state-of-mind in which it finds itself, Dasein never is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was- that is to say, which constantly is as having been”
    -Temporality makes it possible to unite existence, facticity and falling to create a the structure of care. These items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more them temporality does so “in the course of time” (the future, the having been and the present)
    -temporality is not an entity. But makes possible Dasein’sn modes of Being
    -Care is Being-towards-death. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exist finitely.

    did I miss any key points?

  14. Leah Aitken
    Sean Carroll’s From Eternity to Here
    Part One: Time, Experience and The Universe
    Chapter 1. The Past is Present Memory
    “What is time? If no one asks me, I know. If I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not”
    -St. Augustine, Confessions
    Time comes in three different aspects:
    1. Time labels moments in the universe
    “Time is Nature’s way of keeping everything from happening at once”
    -John Archibald Wheeler (American physicist)
    – Time is a coordinate; it helps us locate things.
    – The world continually changes and appears to us, not simultaneously, but again and again, in various configurations. These configurations are somehow distinct and we keep them straight by labeling them with the concept of time.
    -Time provides a sequence that puts each instance of the world in order (this happened before that happened, and the other thing is going to happen after). The world and its objects, for the most part, are persistent and therefore, we experience a degree of continuity through time.
    -We use both time and space to help us pinpoint things that happen in the universe. An event is defined as a certain location in space at one definite moment in time. The universe is said to be four-dimensional, needing three coordinates of space, and one of time in order to distinguish a certain event.
    2. Time measures the duration elapsed between events
    -Not only does time label and give order to different moments, it also measures the distance between them.
    -“Dividing the universe into different moments and measuring the elapsed time between events”. Distinguishing between the two is necessary to understand relativity.
    -The key to measuring time is “synchronized repetition”; a concept which depends on the predictability of processes that keep repeating themselves relative to other repeating processes. We therefore measure duration through the number of repetitions of such processes.
    -As human beings we feel the passage of time and it is affected by external conditions or our emotional states even though our internal clocks are moving the same as usual.
    -Time has a direction and it points from the past toward the future.
    3. Time is medium through which we move
    -We hit a snag when we say time flows. An actual flow is a change of location of time yet time doesn’t have a location.
    -Look at the world from a view of “nowhen”, a perspective separate from any particular moment in time. Therefore, we can see all the history at once – past, present and future. Also called “block time” or “block universe”.
    -Time is something we reconstruct from the correlations of ordered events.
    -Presentist: someone who believes that the only present memory is real. Ex. Augustine
    -Externalism: the past, present, and future are all equally real.
    Chapter 2: The heavy hand of Entropy
    -The arrow of time: time has a direction and is the same for everybody.
    -Certain events always happen in the same order (irreversible processes).
    -The direction of time relies on the concept of “entropy”: how disorderly the system is. The entropy of an isolated system either remains constant or increases with time (Second law of Thermodynamics).
    -We carry representations of the past in form of memories and make predictions about the future. We are able to form a reliable memory of the past because the entropy was lower then.
    -We distinguish past from future through the relationship between cause and effect. The effects generally involve an increase in entropy.
    -Possibilism: the current moment exists, and the past exists, but the future does not (yet) exist.
    Chapter 3: The Beginning and End of Time
    -The evolution of the universe through time, beginning with a hot, dense Big Bang, expanding and forming stars and galaxies, eventually accelerating into emptiness.
    -The early universe came out of the Big Bang. Some believe time and space did not exist before the Big Bang.
    -Sean Carroll believes that time and space did exist prior to the Big Bang and describes this bang as a kind of transition from one phase to another.
    -On a very large scale, then universe is homogeneous: its more or less the same everywhere.
    -The universe started out as an incredibly hot, dense state. Space then expanded and matter diluted and cooled, passing through a variety of transitions.
    -Gravity acts to turn up “the contrast knob” on the universe. In a region with slightly more matter than average will have a gravitational force that pulls things together. Conversely, in regions that are slightly underdense, matter tends to flow outward to the denser regions.
    -“Growth of structure is an irreversible process that naturally happens toward the future, whether the universe is expanding or contracting: it represents an increase in entropy”.

  15. Martin Heidegger: Being and Time

    -Heidegger begins with stating that his phenomenology is “double edged” in a sense that he has to criticize Kant and at the same time explain better than Husserl did.

    -Heidegger begins with explaining that the objective time and how it relates to temporality and the experience of duration.

    -Time cannot be understood through eternity, but through the human mind.

    -He then says that the faculty of psychology is empty because it tries to tell us something by only telling us where it occurs.

    -Psychology is empty and circular because: ???

    -His goal is to show that time is better explained by starting from primordial time rather than from the ordinary understanding of time.

    -There are three features of time that the ordinary understanding of time that is expressed incorrectly.

    -First, time has an irreversible directionality to it that the ordinary understanding of time cannot explain.

    -Second, time is finite, but the ordinary understanding views it as infinite.

    -Third, the metaphor for time as a river is wrong because time does not flow “downstream,” as it were. In particular, it does not flow from past to the present and toward the future.

    -World time, which has the phenomenological characteristics that Heidegger calls datability, significance, spannedness, and publicness.

    -Datability assigns a time, such as “now,” “then,” or “on that occasion.”

    -For Heidegger, the span of time can vary with the interpretive range of what is significant. Humans find themselves thrown into a situation that already determines what is significant and what is not.

    -Publicness refers to the fact that Dasien is always “being with others”

    -Time will have a public character insofar as it is used to coordinate different activities.

    -In most habitual activities, time was perceived as passing the same as clock time. Most faster or timeless temporalities occurred in complex, and skill-requiring activities that had participants.

    -The ordinary understanding is that time is an infinite series of now’s, that is countable, discrete points that succeed one another in a sequence, much like a string of pearls. This ordinary understanding of time makes the mistake of turning time into moments, that is, a series of present, at hand entities.

    -The ordinary conception of time simply differentiates those now’s that have occurred from those that have not yet occurred.

    -“In the way time is ordinarily understood, however, the basic phenomenon of time is seen in the ‘Now,’ and indeed in that pure ‘Now’ which has been shown in its full structure—that which they call the ‘Present.”

    -He describes the ordinary conception of the future as “a pure ‘Now’ which has not yet come along but is only coming along. Therefore, the ordinary sense of the past is as the pure ‘Now’ which has passed away.

    -Heidegger’s distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic shows that Dasein participates in the temporalization of its own life.

    -Inauthentic life is an example of a disconnected temporalization. Heidegger’s emphasis on Dasein’s own role in creating itself as a unified self stretching from birth to death shows that he values coherence over discontinuity.

    -The inauthentic present attitude is to sit back and wait for time to pass and for things to happen. In this way, one just blunders along without any focused attempt to connect one’s life.

    – Heidegger does not provide a concrete definition of what he means by ‘authenticity,’ though, he does say how to achieve authenticity. Heidegger claims that the only way to achieve authenticity is to live a life in pursuit of possibility

    – Husserl’s discussion is of how each Now involves both retention of previous Nows and a protention of futural ones. Where as Heideggers authentic temporality involves what he calls “ecstases” whereby the present is really an anticipation of a future from the standpoint of an already configured past. The future has priority over the present because the present experience is of a future that is coming toward the present. There is no pure presence because the present that is experienced is always already past. The experience of time passing is not the flow of time from a past toward a future so much as of the future coming into the present.

    -For Husserlians, the awareness that one is oneself is having the experience of what accounts for the connectedness of experience. For Heideggerians, it is not subjectivity but being in a world that is intelligible that accounts for the connectedness of experience.

    Edmund Husserl: On time- Consciousness

    – Husserl begins this piece starting with the fact that he wrote a book editing pieces from Martin Heidegger who was also writing intensively about time.

    -He felt that experience should be examined in the way that it occurs.

    Three important questions were mentioned:

    1) Which comes first, experience and temporality or objective time (clock time)?

    Temporal experience is not like a string of pearls which is self contained and identifiable and discrete from every other pearl in the string. Pearls match each other to look alike. Experience is when the temporal event of the Columbia shuttle tragedy occupies an unchanging, determinate temporal position in world-time, “frozen” between what came before and after it, travelling into the past of world history without losing its place.

    – Temporality involves a three layered phenomenon of primal impression, protention and retention. Moreover, protention, retention, and primal impression are all part of each experience. Temporality “is time as it manifests itself in human existence”

    Primal Impression: ???

    – Protention and Retention: The projected horizon, the intentional anticipation that reaches toward the immediate future, just as the retention holds onto the immediate past in the fading out of the primal impression and includes the quality of sinking into the past

    – Objective time – clock-time is regularly understood as a quantitative measure of the flow of the time. It can refer to universal time, clock time, or objective time”

    – First, the experiences that are everything we see.
    – Second, the forms that the temporal takes, i.e. the modes in which time is intuitively given (the phenomenon of “flowing” and the temporal modes of present, past and future)
    – Third- the constitution of a single objective time or clock time.

    -In most habitual activities, time was perceived as passing the same as clock time. Most faster or timeless temporalities occurred in complex, and skill-requiring activities that had participants.

    2) How can there be one time if everybody has different temporalities?

    -It is clear that someone else might think at a different rate than you, so therefore how does that mean that they aren’t experiencing the world at a different pace than you?

    -Duration is when one moment reflects the previous one and anticipates the next one.

    -There is no account for duration and it involves the qualitative aspects of temporal experience.

    -Duration is an intentional experience which intentionality is simply consciousness of something.

    -“Furthermore, I doubt that it is right to say that I can retain a retention of a retention. Just as I do not perceive my perception of an object, but the object itself, I do not remember having a memory (whether primary or secondary), but I remember the content of the memory first. Only then can I remember having remembered it on earlier occasions.”

    – Everyone’s perspective is different, but there is only one organizational principle for the duration of anything.

    3) Whether temporality can be said to “flow”? What direction does it flow?
    What happens to the present, which is always there even though the content is always different?

    “Time is fixed and time flows”

    -To illustrate his account, we can return to his example of hearing a melody. Which is Husserl’s favorite type of temporal object.

    -When one listens to the note for its own, one is making the temporal slice across the flow of time that we call the present. But hearing each note, one after the other, is not the same as hearing the melody. The melody requires a stretch of connected time, which is a flow.

    -The direction is horizontal flow: impressional consciousness of each now, retentional of the past, and protentional of future. This point is modeled by extending a line.

    -Temporal experience is not like a string of pearls which is self contained and identifiable and discrete from every other pearl in the string. Pearls match each other to look alike which

    -When some unpleasant experience is behind us, we feel glad that it is over. But if the Eternalism is correct, there is no such property as being over or no longer happening now, it continues to exist timelessly.

  16. Leah Aitken
    From Eternity to Here
    Part 2: Time in Einstein’s Universe
    CHAPTER 4: Time is Personal
    -Einstein and other researchers developed the theory of relativity:
    Special relativity: explains how the speed of light can have the same value for all observers
    General relativity: interprets gravity as an effect of the curvature of spacetime
    -both form the basic framework for our modern understanding of space and time and are crucial in the explanation for the arrow of time
    -we would not be able to determine our position, orientation, or velocity without relativity
    -the speed of light is simply a universal invariant. Everyone measures light to be moving at the same speed, independent of the motion of the experimenter. Consequently, nothing can move faster than light
    -the speed of light displays that there exists some unique preferred velocity through spacetime
    -if a meterstick passes by us at a high velocity, it appears shorter than a meterstick at rest because it undergoes “length contraction”
    -if a clock moves by us at a high velocity, it appears to be ticking more slowly than the clock that is sitting at rest because it undergoes “time dilation”
    -both length contraction and time dilation are ways of thinking about special relativity
    -special relativity tells us to avoid making statements about separated events happening at the same time
    – the time measured by a clock depends on the particular trajectory that the clock takes
    -clocks are kind of like odometers (instruments used to measure the distance travelled) and time is therefore kind of like space
    -in a Newtonian world, space and time were completely separate entities. Special relativity says there are not two different things: “distance in space” measured by odometers and “duration in time” measured by clocks. Instead, there is only one thing, the interval in spacetime between two events
    -having a special speed (the speed of light) as part of the laws of nature provides a way to translate between space and time
    -every object defines a world line—the path the object takes through spacetime
    -once they pass through one moment of time, they can never double backward in time to pass through the same moment again. This Newtonian rule that “you must move forward in time” is replaced by a new rule stating that you must move more slowly than the speed of light
    -according to relativity, every event comes with a light cone, defined by all possible paths light take to or from that point. Events outside the light cone cannot clearly be labeled as “past” or “future”.
    -saying you cannot move faster than the speed of light is equivalent to saying that your world line must remain inside the light cone of every event through which it passes
    -we describe slower-than-light objects as “timelike” and objects that move faster than light as “spacelike”
    -the cone divides spacetime into the past and future of a certain event
    – the unidimensional nature of time, compared with the three dimensions of space, forces it to move in only one particular direction
    -Einstein’s most famous equation the energy of an object at rest is proportional to its mass: E=mc² (mass X the speed of light squared)
    -this equation is a profound feature of the dynamics of energy all around us
    CHAPTER 5: Time is Flexible
    -Einstein was determined to fit gravity, the most obvious force in the universe, into the language of relativity
    -the Principle of Equivalence states that no local experiment can detect the existence of gravitational field because the apparent effects of the force of gravity are equivalent to those in an accelerating reference frame
    -according to general relativity, free fall is the natural, unforced state of motion. Only the push from the surface of the Earth deflects us from our appointed path.
    -since gravity is universal, we can think of it as a feature of spacetime itself and as a manifestation of the curvature of spacetime.
    -a “straight line” on a curved geometry is the shortest curve connecting two points. In flat geometry, parallel lines will extend forever. With curved geometry, initially parallel lines will eventually intersect
    -Einstein proposed that four-dimensional spacetime can be curved; it can vary in magnitude and in shape from place to place.
    -time as measured by a clock on the Earth’s surface will be shorter than that measured by one thrown into the air, as the former clock is on an accelerated (non-free-falling) trajectory.
    -Einstein’s most important equation is believed to be his field equation for general relativity: it reveals how things in the universe cause spacetime to curve, and therefore causes gravity.
    -the formula: Curvature of spacetime = various forms that make spacetime curve (energy, momentum, pressure, etc.)
    -Black holes represent an interesting prediction of general relativity. These holes are described as “objects where the gravitational field is so strong that light itself cannot escape”.
    -light cones tilt into the vicinity of a black hole. The event horizon, defining the boundary of the black hole, is the place where they tip over so far that nothing can escape without moving faster than light.
    -there is a singularity that lies inside every black hole; a singularity of infinite curvature due to the density and spacetime curvature being able to increase without limit
    -a white hole is the reverse of a black hole in reference to time. There is a singularity in the past from which cones emerge, with the event horizon that lies to the future. The external world then lies to the future of that.
    CHAPTER 6: Looping through time
    -travelling backwards in time is only possible by moving faster than the speed of light
    -tachyons are defined as particles that move faster than the speed of light and travel along a path that takes them to a previous point on the same world line. They are incompatible with the laws of physics and don’t seem to exist.
    -our trajectories through spacetime are limited by the speed of light and make us move “forward in time”, toward some other event inside our light cone. As previously mentioned, tilting of these cones can lead to black holes.
    -if there was spacetime in which light cones titled around a circle, it would create a closed timelike curve (CTC) that would eventually bring us at one moment in our lives face-to-face with ourselves at some other moment. It’s the curvature of spacetime itself that brings you into contact with your own past.
    -this circular-time universe is an exact solution to Einsteins equation
    -one simple rule which resolves all possible time travel paradoxes is that paradoxes do not happen.
    -we cannot have a consistent arrow of time in the presence of closed timelike curve
    -the concept of free will enables the future to be up for grabs and the increase of entropy is consistent with any number of possible futures
    -life on a closed timelike curve seems predestined as you will always end up back to precisely the state in which it started
    -wormholes: a shortcut through space allowing you to get from one place to another much faster than you would if you took a direct route through the bulk of spacetime
    -time machines fascinate us because they seem to open the door to paradoxes and challenge our notions of free will
    -on the other hand, the arrow of time in unquestionably a feature of the real world

  17. -Black holes are not made up of what they originated from. Ex he gives: “a black hole made out of a ball of gas the mass of the sun is indistinguishable from a black hole made out of a ball of ice cream the mass of the sun.”

    -There are three things we can know about black holes: total mass, its net electric charge and how fast it is spinning.

    -Hawking and Penrose proposed the singularity theorems- that when gravity becomes strong enough, like a big bang or a black hole, general relativity necessarily predict the existence of singularites.

    -Hawking and Bekenstein together proved that black holes really do behave like thermodynamic objects. The entropy of a black hole is proportional to its event horizon. Hawking was also able to get an exact amount of how much energy, which was ¼.

    -Black holes eventually will evaporate away as one virtual particle pair gets near the event horizon, or edge of the black hole. One positive particle may pop out, meaning the other particle must be negative if the charge of the two is 0. This means, that the mass of the black hole is gradually decreasing.

    -A big question arises as to whether or not information is lost in black holes or somehow preserved.

    -Black holes have more entropy then that of which it was made.

    -We should in theory be able to specify all the certain macrostates of a three dimensional black hole, but its two dimensional event horizon, but this a big problem that theoretical physicists haven’t been able to accomplish yet.

    -The universes configuration is not random or else it would be at a high entropy state, which it is not.

    -The state of the early universe was not random and there was a “chosen” macrostate that made it so special. But the question is, why was it made this way, and why is it increasing in entropy rather then trying to go back to is previous smooth state?

    -The maximum entropy we can have in one fixed spacetime is a black hole.

    -“If within the next few years, human beings perfect an immortality machine and/or drug, cosmologists who live forever will have to content themselves with observing an increasingly empty universe. Stars will die out, black holes will evaporate, and everything will be pushed away by the accelerating effects of vacuum energy.”

    -The Universe looks very flat, and “as far as anyone can tell, there is no measurable curvature in the universe today at all.” Because the universe is flat now, it had to be flat in the past.

    -I didn’t really understand the part about event horizons, probably because I don’t understand light cones and what they mean/represent.

    -A theory as to why we are currently in a relatively low-entropy state is simply that the universe at the beginning was at an even much lower state. Over time entropy increases, so we are just in the stage where the universe is “relaxing” into its future high entropy state.

    -An example Sean Carroll uses to describe entropy is a game of billiards. He says that if you suppose that the balls lost no energy or speed from friction and kept moving forever, but got stuck only on one particular spot on the tables wall, then eventually all the energy on the table would slow or stop and this is similar to what will happen to our universe. In a googol of years, all that will be left are small particle fluctuations so minute that if we could observe it from the outside it would almost be impossible to see.

    -He says that time was not eternal and that it came to be with the big bang, and that the universe started out at a very low-entropy state, and “you’re not allowed to ask why,” about the last part.

    -There is a theory that the universe will try to restore symmetry and there will be a big crunch where everything is just pulled in and squat together. But this raises the question of how could entropy be continually increasing if everything is being pulled towards its smooth past as the big bang?

    -He then questions the fact that perhaps the big bang isn’t the beginning of the universe at all, and then that changes his main question or focus from why was the universe in such a low entropy state, to why was it in a low entropy state at the time of the big bang and what does that mean for entropy before the big bang?

    -This brings about the theory that from the big bang onwards is considered expansion and going backwards is contraction. Like a U-shape, it is possible that entropy increases as the universe expands, but before this bounce, it also increased. Basically if the big bang is the middle of a graph, that is the lowest point and it rises on both sides as time progresses.

  18. Philosophy Handout: Thinking in an Emergency- Chapter 1
    Rachel Byrne

    Elaine Scarry begins her book by writing of a prediction made by Clinton Rossiter, “The atomic age will soon be governed by emergency rule and a soldiery executive figure”. She continues by agreeing with his prediction due to nuclear weapons. She highlights the countries who posses these weapons, who has the ability to launch them (presidents, prime ministers etc.) and most importantly what they do to the populations of each country.
    More specifically:
    -nuclear weapons undermined democracy and increase executive power (this is done by invoking the idea of emergency)
    -Nuclear weapons have bypassed structures that make up or characterize democratic governance.
    – “each country has a population that could bring its own national laws to bear ridding itself of both nuclear weapons and legal deformations caused by those weapons” —> Didn’t really get this part
    By the end of the 20th century many countries were living in “chronic emergency” which more powers are going to the countries leaders.
    Scarry continues by writing that she believes that regular citizens reclaiming the power to protect and democratic principles is possible. She continues to write that it is time that the population reacquires our responsibility for governance. It would be risky to try and go against a countries government, but wouldn’t it be more risky if the population didn’t do anything at all?
    Just by creating nuclear weapons, populations of countries have given up democracy.
    – we still have legal procedures that can prevent nuclear weapons
    -nuclear weapons endanger most of the world.
    Scarry quoted some early legal principle that meant “that which touches all requires everyone’s agreement”. Nuclear weapons not only figuratively touch people but also physically. It seems like this kind of weapons should be discussed by countries populations as a whole.
    The argument of increasing governmental power is furthered by the discussion of the United States. In the second half of the 20th century proceeding into the 21st, the US has sanctioned the right to:
    -Practice of torture (Huge region of war crime)
    -detention without charge
    -widespread surveillance of citizens
    – private mercenary armies at the command of solely the president
    Furthermore, the use and creation of nuclear weapons has bypassed 2 provisions of the constitution:
    (1) Initiating war without formal declaration
    (2) executive military force that acts independently of population’s authorization and consent
    *Both these provisions are used so military authority would be in the hands of the population ensuring democracy.

    The Claim of Emergency
    Elaine leaves the idea of Nuclear Weapons and starts talking about how people react in emergencies.
    She starts with the “implicit claim of emergencies” which states “All procedures and all thinking must cease because the emergency requires that 1) an action must be taken, and 2) the action must be taken relatively quickly.”
    Why would someone not think deliberatively before making an action?

    Aristotle’s Differentiation of Thinking
    (1) What is= Perception
    (2) form of thinking leading towards decisions = contemplation
    (3) whether to do one thing or another = deliberation

    It is pointed out that governing and thinking are coupled by recalling that many political treatises tended to be written by people who have written treatises about how we think (i.e. Plato or John Stuart Mill).
    To suspend thinking while in an emergency would be a suspension of government.

    Lessons from Aesop’s Fable- The Boy who is drowning in the River
    (1) one ought not get into an emergency
    (2) one ought not get into a situation that makes it appropriate for someone to remind you of Lesson #1
    (3) whatever happens keep talking -> I didn’t really get this one (Scarry later says that this dictum is lost in Thucydides’ (greek historian) writings of the plague).
    I didn’t really find Aesop’s lessons to be extremely relevant considering 2/3 are obvious. So I’m not quite sure why she included it into her works

    What I understood from most of that section was that cognitive acts= anticipation and elimination of emergency and thinking = the end of an emergency and not thinking does not end an emergency. But then she continues to talk about Baudelaire’s Swan, from this fable I learned that thinking in an emergency is difficult (remaining coherent) because your mind is in a frenzy. So maybe it isn’t actually possible to think in an emergency.
    Human beings lose social and political structures when in an emergency. Our deepest impulses are asocial and anarchic.

    3 alternative political descriptions of the population
    1. Immobilization: being incapable of starting our own actions therefore we are highly susceptible to orders from someone else
    2. Incoherent action \
    Self authorizing agency remains at some level to perform an action
    3. Coherent action /

    In an emergency
    – it is possible to fall away from normal habits
    -other habits might come into play to help you in that emergency

    The final part of the chapter Elaine talks about where the seduction to stop thinking comes from
    (1) False opposition between thinking and acting
    (2) plausible (which in the end is false?) opposition between thinking and rapid acting
    (3) Acts of thinking that happen in emergencies are not recognized by us as “acts of thinking” -we thinking of habits as empty of thought

  19. Thinking in an Emergency – Ch. 2
    First Model
    The first model is cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. Classic CPR procedures consists rules of counting. For how many times to compress and has different sets of counting for breathes and compressions. It also has different rules when the rescuer has a partner that will help the victim.
    CPR will become a habit after going through the sets a few times, which in this case helps thinking in an emergency. If rescuers know what to do in need of CPR, they will have the ability to think clearly.
    The earliest traces of aspirations for CPR was in ancient Egypt and ancient Hebrew, both receptive to the miracle of reanimation. There was a study in Kenya on CPR with 114 children that were mostly under the age of six. 25/82 children who’s heart stopped began to breathe again and 18/82 children survived (22% survival rate). When a children’s heart and lungs stop working, 5/32 children survive. In Nigeria’s study, 13 people were given CPR and 5 survived.
    It is recommended that nurses are retrained every six months because CPR is “short term knowledge” so it needs to be recertified. It was found that in 2010 study in Boston, Massachusetts that physicians and nurses that specialize in emergency was below expectations of the knowledge of CPR.
    “CPR is built on repetition”
    CPR must be spread all across all the countries to be effective, because most cardio-arrests don’t happen in the hospitals, ¾ happen in a home, at work or on the streets. The survival rate of CPR triples if CPR starts on the victim within the first minute of heart/lung failure.
    James Elam’s medicine research found that exhalation you only need 16% of oxygen level and inhalation 21% to allow the blood to become and hold 100% of saturation level.
    In the hospital, 20 patients suffered from cardio-arrest in the hospital and 14 survived with compression lasting from one minute to 65 minutes (ages range from two months to 80). In japan, 1.4 million people are trained each year and in an eight year study survival rate went from 19% to 36% with the defibrillator.
    We still need to keep reviewing our knowledge of CPR, and change it with in time and new studies, slong with consistently teaching people and recertifying. There are some studies now saying that it is more beneficial for compression-only than the classic CPR. This was because compression-only was easier for untrained bystanders, easier to explain by a professional on the phone, people are hesitant with mouth-to-mouth, and the requirement of survival of CPR is beating their heart 100bpm but if someone stops to give a breath it may be more damaging if it slows down the process. This study here shows that people need to know CPR well to make it a habit to create a better chance of survival for the victim
    Second Model
    The second model is Mutual Aid Contracts. In Saskatchewan “each party to the agreement will assist any other party in agreement in an event of a disaster”. Sizes of these parties vary, but usually between three to four rural districts. This helps these communities to pool resources when they are in need and unable to do so for themselves.
    An example is in 2000, 80 houses suffered from a downpour of rain, with 13 in of water in one night. The community didn’t have any sources of water for three months except from outside communities that were willing to donate bottles of water because the water that they had were affected by E.Coli. The other communities also brought food and volunteers.
    The mutual aid requires the community through about what tools are needed during these situations; floods, fire, mudslide, chemical spills, high winds, and tornados. Another example was when grain elevator caught on fire in 1990 in Naicam with 900 residences. Within 15 minutes four fire trucks showed up and it became a nine hour fire fight. With every fire truck they use 10,000lts of water and they had 20 other farm trucks that held small tanks of water. The community ran out of water therefore had to evacuate citizens to another community.
    Kindersley planned to be able to house 1,500 people, and to test it they hosted a week a week of sport games of December 1994, and housed 1,500 athletes. These help test and design emergency procedures.
    When Japan went through an earthquake in 1995 and left 6,000 dead and 350,000 homeless. Then 1.2 million volunteers and 1.6 million donated to these districts. Before the earthquake Japan did not mentally rehearse how to deal with earthquakes but they practiced “habits of mutual aid”. Which means that they were already in a habit of giving and supporting one another in their community. They clean parks, maintain roads, clear streams and repair street lamps as if it was their own responsibility instead of the governments.
    These groups that take one these responsibilities are almost entirely independent of the government.
    50% of Ethiopia gave seeds to associations that are outside the mutual agreement, mainly because they were already in a habit of giving.
    “The question is not whether habit will surface in an emergency, but instead which habit will emerge”.
    In the 11th and the 12th century 500 major European cities come into mutual aid socicities to protect from external sources of human aggression through oath-taking, contract-taking.
    Third Model
    The third model is the Swiss Shelter System. The habit in emergency preparation of The Swiss Shelter System is shaped three underlying assumptions.
    1. The focus of injury in any war will be the civilians. The ratio soldier/civilian deaths esculated in WWI, WW2, Korean War and the Vietnam War.
    2. Therefore a shelter system is necessary to save civilian and the country.
    3. “Equality of survival” Equal opportunity of survival.
    Switzerland law was to have a fallout shelter. On May 18 2003 80% of the population voted in favor of all civilians building a fallout shelter in every home. For people who don’t build one has to pay compensation for public shelters.
    Federal Law on Civil Protection forces a yearly refresher course of 2-7 days, in addition of two to three weeks of original training and two weeks of advance training.
    Switzerland believes preserving population keeps residents free from physical injury and keeping intact networks of family, friends and cultural artifacts.
    The United States and the population ‘discovered’ that these shelters that Switzerland created were usless and increased the chance of way (this was with no research).
    The White House is a big target , therefore they made a shelter for the president. The shelter is at Mount-Weather, but when they tested the procedure they realized that the road that takes them to the shelter would be blocked by people, if there was an emergency. Citizens wold have to give assistance and consent for the president to proceed with their evacuation to their shelter.
    During this time Switzerland had created 3 million new fallout shelters, 127 emergency operating rooms, 311 first aid station, 892 first aid post, 96,000 hospital beds within 10 years.
    The difference between Switzerland and the United States is that Switzerland’s goal was legal equality, and the United States spent all their money on the president and none on the population. They are also the largest nuclear-weapon holder in the world.
    Fourth Model
    The fourth model is eliminating weapons all together.
    In Ohio a navy class submarine holds 4,00 Hiroshima bombs. These people go in heavy training where their first and only day of non-training was half way through, at 90 days. This training maintains the instant nuclear-weapon-launch abilities that are needed for good habits to rise in an emergency.
    United States does not have a system that will protect their people from civil war but the Constitution has two provisions. The Constitution states that “war cannot be 1) entered into, and 2) sustained over a prolonged period, without reasons convincing enough to persuade large assemblies of people, both within the nation a legislature and within the population at large, of the need to injure foreign peoples.”
    She mentions about who leads the United States into war, the President, Congress (535 members)? Congress was designed to oversee any entry of the United States going into war.
    For the French constitution, to declare war the Parliament has to authorize it. Russia can defend at once to defend the country in the country but the military force needs authorization of the federal council for outside the borders.
    An important topic she brought up was the thought of the population’s right of being entitled to give an opinion or consent for their country to be a part of a war. The only time the population gave a ‘rich evidence of soldier’s’ consent (or was asked) was in the Vietnam War, World War I, and the American Civil War.
    There are three alternative outcomes of emergency. Emergency is immobilization, incoherent action, or coherent action (CPR, Canadian social contracts, the Swiss shelter system and the US constitutional provisions overseeing war). Almost all instances of coherent emergency action are habit.


    Chapter 3 Page 80-108


    -This chapter summarizes the importance of thinking in an emergency.
    There are three beliefs. The first one demonstrates that action requires putting aside thinking. The second belief is that rapid action (impulse) normally requires putting aside thinking and the third belief is that thinking requires setting aside habit.

    -Deliberation normally inhabits a temporal space to the action, which is its outcome. For example: If one deliberates about the best book to read, reaching for the book follows it. The same is true for greater decisions such as if a faculty that deliberates a rule change will most likely take a vote and institute the decision.

    -In the case of an emergency, this is a little different. There is a long temporal break between the deliberation and the action. There is a long pause between figuring out CPR procedures and the moment one is called upon to use that knowledge. The procedure must be made habitual in the most highly self-conscious way. Ordinarily, the more something is practiced the more habitual it becomes. For example: Nursing trains you for emergencies so that when one does happen it the nurses don’t have to take that long pause and can act immediately.

    -There is no need to take a few days of the year to practice driving a car or to practice reading because life keeps putting these situations in front of us everyday, conditioning us to make it a habit so we do not have to consciously think of it.

    -Greek and Christian writers, American thinkers and continental theorists described habit as a powerful tool of cognition and then went on to relate habit and deliberation together since deliberation brings light to the way we think in an emergency.

    -The place of habit in deliberation will be clearer if it is preceded by a consideration of two other mental events: sensory perception, which is the bodies’ un-conscious reaction to external stimuli and creation, which are mental events that play in an emergency.


    -Habit is not a “slight adjustment” in the character of sensory perception, dulling perception-negative habit or enhancing perception-positive habit. “Habit cuts into the heart of sensation, either closing it down entirely” [83] or building up perception, which means it, is not the way you sense things in life but rather the way you perceive it. “Building up perception at its own interior” refers to the fact that perception is a building block for pertaining a habit and once you build up a perception you bring it to “being”.

    -Habit is then shown to be a powerful agent for regulating and creating the acuity of sentience, which is awareness. Just as one may regulate the amount of light that enters the eyes, the amount of angles your head tilts, you may also regulate the habits you pertain by either rushing toward one or “instead close it to keep it wholly at bay?”

    -Once it becomes a habit we become “insensible” in a sense that the novelty has worn off and it has become a sensory adaptation. For example: Montaigne uses smell as his model by saying that once we are used to a certain smell it is no longer knowable to us, it remains knowable to others in a sense that Habit stupefies our senses” This is also true for the hearing example when you live close to church bells, and even hear sirens frequently these sounds eventually become adapted to our hearing and we no longer recognize them as loud as others would. To me, when I moved to the city I used to notice the sirens all the time but now I barely notice them because it happens so often. Sirens no longer faze me as much as before now which helped create a relaxed environment and the same goes for an emergency, once everything is taught and practiced “thinking in an emergency” becomes rather normal and un-conscious.

    -Our perception is adapted to cosmos when a habit is developed we deprive ourselves from great beauty and spirit.

    -The concreteness of Montaigne is important when he refers to habit makes us insensible and very literally means that sensory perception is “stupefied” or “put to sleep”. Habit disposes us to be “insensitive, automatic and robotic”

    Both Aristotle and William James give definitions of habit. For Aristotle habit is “precisely the acquisition of habit that marks the fact of our being animate, differentiates us from the inanimate.” This means that it marks the fact of our being as lively and makes us different from the things lacking vitality such as a car or a book. Aristotle concludes that weather the greatest excellences and that happiness that attends them come from the Gods or is from “learning or by habituation or training” In other words a degree is acquired by some process of learning or training.

    -William James refers to habit as not separating the animate and inanimate but viewing habit as perception as it takes place in the brain and spinal cord as they inscribe themselves into the material substance of the human being. He pictures formation of habits as it occurs on the neuronal level. The key word linked to habit is “plasticity” which is defined as “weak enough to yield to a influence but strong enough not to yield all at once.” Which is the ability to adapt to a habit or the ability to resist a habit. “The phenomena of habit in living things are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed.” In other words, eating fruit allows antioxidants into the body to do great things for us. Our brain and spinal cord is encased in “bony boxes” which allow us to not be responsive to thermal or mechanical pressure. Our brain is our primary instrument from the master it belongs to.

    -Any theorist committed to sensory acuity is achieved by habit will also be a theorist committed to education.

    -James Dewy uses the example of color in a sense that habit is connected to sensation by our highest spiritual accomplishments and to education. Dewy says that it takes time to learn and adapt to colors. “To be able to single out a definitive sensory element in any field is evidence of a high degree of previous training” Which is a sign of training, skill and habit.

  21. “Women’s Time”

    Julia Kristeva

    Kristeva seems to be trying to find a place for women in post-war Europe through an investigation of time.

    There are two kinds of time: linear and monumental.

    These kinds of time can be understood within the context of post-war Europe, where the three pillars of that constitute are nation (according to Marx) have been destroyed.

    The pillars that create the cohesion of a nation are economic hegemony, historical tradition, and linguistic unity.

    The economy under one authority, and the relative stasis that creates, (which Kristeva calls an illusion) was transformed into an interdependent economic system. Kristeva was writing this in the early 1980s, but I think this is even more evident in our present, globalized market, and its emphasis on trade. Or, perhaps, on the domination of transnational corporations, which create a new hegemony that transcends nation—these companies have no home country.

    Historical tradition and linguistic unity are Kristeva’s focus, because they, too, transcend nationhood, and become a more “broader and deeper determinant” (13). She calls this the symbolic denominator: denominator because it is the essential foundation of a new, larger social group and symbolic because it representative of an attitude, particularly an attitude towards the reproduction of humans (and implicitly, gender roles).

    Rather than being overwhelmed by the now symbolic denominator, nations embody it in particular ways, which Kristeva beautifully calls “a kind of future perfect” (14); it influences the nation that it will have become. This kind of time is monumental, not linear.

    Similar to nations, other social groups of symbolic denominator exist in monumental time. Kristeva focuses on “groups defined according to their place in production, but especially according to their role in the mode of reproduction and its representations” (14-15). She is talking about women. (See title.)

    Kristeva points out that the feminine has usually been linked to space, not time. She cites examples from Joyce and Freud and most interestingly, Plato, whose concept of the chora, which gives birth to the One (making it both female and prior to the good). However, certain kinds of time have been associated with the feminine. Specifically, cyclical time is female because it is characterized by the eternal repetition of nature, as is monumental because it is “all-encompassing and infinite” (16), making it mythical. Kristeva argues these kinds time are foundational to linear time and the civilizations built upon it.

    Kristeva discusses two generations of feminism and of women, but she prefaces it with a point about the problem of speaking of women as a single entity: it fails to acknowledge the differences in the “diverse functions and structures which operate beneath this word” (18). She continues to argue that emphasizing diversity amongst women could uncover a more true and “fundamental difference between the two sexes” (18).

    The first generation of feminism participated in linear time. Linear time is that which measures progress and projects—it is the modern historical narrative. In struggling for equality in the political and economic realms of life, these feminists “aspired to gain a place in linear time” (18). According to Kristeva, they also denied feminine characteristics because “they are deemed incompatible with insertion in that history” (18); basically, because they are unsuitable for progress. Joining linear time, which is male at least insofar as it has been dominated by men since time immemorial, requires this forgoing of the feminine. Of course, Kristeva notes the necessity of the resulting sociopolitical gains, and characterizes them as a product of linear time. This generation of feminism made claims for the “Universal Woman”, a concept is only possible in historical time, which includes all the particular structures women exist on.

    Kristeva argues that in second generation of feminism “linear temporality has been almost entirely refused, and as a consequence these has arisen an exacerbated distrust of the entire political dimension” (19). Rather than focusing on the collective, these women struggle to find a place for individual, subjective experience. This place exists within monumental time.

    Kristeva outlines two “sociopolitical events” (20) that produce these generations of feminism: socialism and Freudianism.

    Socialism, she argues, considers the human being as determined by its relations of and to production and ignores one’s role in reproduction. As a result, early feminism has achieved (to some degree) economic, professional, and political equality. However, in this ideology, the feminine character is accidental, not essential. This is evident in the lack of sexual equality (“which implies permissiveness in sexual relations…abortion, and contraception” (21)) in socialist nations.

    Kristeva calls the first three equalities (economic, professional, and political) “a total deception” presumably because “the struggle is no longer concerned with the quest for equality but, rather, with difference and specificity” (21). (I am having trouble connecting this to her arguments on time—is it the case that difference does not exist in linear time? It is clear that socialism, which is quintessentially progressive and thus historical, is on linear time. But I do not see why linear time, which seems to be actually characterized by individual—the maker of history—does not support difference.) Sexual inequality symbolizes unequal power relations.

    Kristeva’s account of Freudianism is meant to elucidate the symbolic difference between men and women, but does not directly connect it to her concept of time. (I suppose that symbols belong to monumental time.)

  22. “Women’s Time”
    Julia Kristeva (page 20-end)
    Kristeva starts off my discussing Socialism and Freudianism, she discussed that this new generation of women shows itself less often in the United States than in Western Europe. This is because of a split in social relations and mentalities and this split is as a result of socialism and Freudianism.
    By socialism she means the egalitarian doctrine that is accepted as based on common sense and is becoming more widely dispersed and the social practice adopted by governments and political parties in democratic regimes which extends the zone of egalitarianism to include the distribution of goods and access to culture
    By Freudianism she means the lever inside the egalitarian and socializing field which poses the question of sexual difference
    Western socialism got rid of women who aspired the recognition of a specificity of the female role in society and culture but retained from them the idea of a necessary identification between the two sexes as the only means for liberating the “second sex”
    Socialist ideology, based on a conception of the human being as determined by its place in production and relations in production didn’t take the human beings place in reproduction into consideration and consequently of this the character of women appeared as nonessential to the totalitarian spirit of this ideology. This same treatment has been imposed on religious specificities in particular on the Jewish.
    What was achieved by this attitude remains important for women; she takes as an example the change in destiny of women in the socialist countries of Europe, Kristeva says that the demands of the suffragists and feminists have to a great extent been met. Three of the main egalitarian demands of feminism have been implemented: economic, political and professional equality
    The fourth is sexual equality, this implies permissiveness in sexual relations (including homosexuality), abortion, and contraception and this remains stricken by taboo in ethics and for reasons of the state. This fourth equality appears essential in the struggle for the new generation, however the struggle is no longer concerned with equality but is now concerned with difference and specificity
    This poses the new generation with the “symbolic question” (symbolic being more strictly used in terms of that function defined by Kristeva in opposition to the semiotic). Sexual difference is no longer just biological, and physiological, it now translates a difference in the relationship of subjects to the symbolic contract, so a difference in the relationship to power, language and meaning. The sharpest point of the new generation of feminists is based on the inseparable conjunction of the sexual and the symbolic, in order to attempt to discover, first, the specificity of the female and then that of each individual woman.
    She moves on to discuss a new social contract that makes way for Freudianism. She first discusses his notion of castration, she believes that these are not ideological fantasies of Freud but logical necessities to be placed at the “origin” to explain what unceasingly functions in neurotic discourse i.e. neurotic discourse can only be understood in terms of its own logic when its causes are fantasies of the primal scene.
    After that I had trouble understanding what she was getting at but she concluded this section by saying that “It can now be seen how women, starting with this theoretical apparatus, might try to understand their sexual and symbolic difference in the framework of social cultural, and professional realization, in order to try, by seeing their position therein” (23)
    The “urgent question on our agenda” is “What can be our place in the symbolic contract?”(23) if the contract is based on a sacrificial relationship of separation and articulation of differences which produces communicable meaning, what is our place in the order of sacrifice and of language?
    How can women reveal their place as it is given to us by tradition and then transform it?
    She acknowledges that it is difficult to evaluate what in the relationship of women and the symbolic arises from sociohistorical conjuncture (Christian, humanist, socialist, etc.) or what arises from a structure
    Structure only in a sociohistorical context, women, “we”, feel that they are casualties and they have been left out of the sociosymbolic contract of language as a social bond. This frustration which is also experienced by men is voiced today principally by women and is becoming the essence of the new feminist ideology. This makes it difficult to identify with the sacrificial logic of separation at the foundation of language and social code leads to the rejection of the symbolic and “ultimately generating psychoses” (24).
    This limit produces two types of counterinvestment termed the sociosymbolic contract
    -there are attempts to take hold of this contract, to possess it in order to enjoy it as such or to subvert it
    -trying to explore the constitution and functioning of this contracts, starting less from the knowledge accumulated about it but more from the very personal affect experienced when facing it as a woman.
    Research is being done to “shatter language” and find a discourse closer to the body and emotions. Not speaking of a “woman’s language” or of the aesthetic quality of productions by women. Kristeva is speaking of the new generation of women showing that its major social concern has become the sociosymbolic contract as a sacrificial contract.
    Kristeva acknowledges that under the pressure from feminist movements women are being promoted to leadership positions in government, industry and culture but there are still inequalities and underestimations of women at this level, this struggle can be summarized by the following questions:
    -“What happens when women come into power and identify with it”
    -“What happens when, on the contrary, they refuse power and create a parallel society, a counterpower which then takes on aspects ranging from a club of ideas to a group of terrorist commandos?”
    The assumption by women of power has not radically changed the nature of the power. Shown in the East where women promoted to decision-making positions obtain economic and narcissistic advantages and become pillars of the governments, guardians of the status quo and protectors of the established order.
    Kristeva states that “innovative initiatives on the part of women inhaled by power systems are soon credited to the systems account, discrediting the women involved, this completely detaches women from it.
    More radical feminists refuse any role of identification with existing power and make a “counter society”. A “female society” against the sociosymbolic contract both sacrificial and frustrating, this counter society is imagined as harmonious, free and fulfilling. The counter society is based, like any society, on the expulsion of an excluded element, a scapegoat, in this case the other sex
    I didn’t understand the next section but she goes on to say “the identification of power inorder to consolidate it or the constitution of a fetishist counterpower seem to be the two social forms which the face-off between the new generation of women and the social contract can take” and that one finds the problem of terrorism there is structurally related.
    She goes on the stat that the large number of women in terrorist groups has been pointed out, and that the exploitation of women is too great and traditional prejudices are too violent. It can be said that this is a product of what we have called a denial of the sociosymbolic contract and its counterinvestment as the only means of self-defense in the struggle to safe guard an identity. This mechanism is at the base of any political involvement.
    Kristeva points out that since the dawn of feminism political activity of exceptional women has taken the form of murder, conspiracy and crime.
    She brings us Spinoza’s question: are women subject to ethics? She answers this saying that “Spinoza’s question can be affirmative only at the cost of considering feminism as but a moment in the thought of that anthropomorphic identity which currently blocks the horizon of the discursive and scientific adventure of our species.”

  23. Bonny Honig’s “Three Models of Emergency Politics”

    In this article, Honig outlines three modi operandi in emergencies and their supporting philosophies. She uses Elaine Scarry’s Thinking in Emergency, Douglas Crimp’s activism during the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, and Luis F. Post’s bureaucratic actions during the First Red Scare as examples of three emergency procedures: Deliberative, Activist, and Legalist.

    Honig is investigating these practices because of how crises affect democracy. She is arguing against a political theory that states when an emergency threatens a democratic populace, authoritative decision-making becomes the norm, and democracy is pushed aside. The three procedures in the article offer an alternative reaction to crisis, one that allows democratic process in an emergency situation. She makes a good point (that probably against intuition, or at least against the status quo) about the necessity of taking risks during a societal crisis. Rather than acting conservatively, it is important that people protest the present conditions, even while they may possibly collapse. Instead of being called “unrealistic”, protesters should be considered creators of a new reality. Honig cites the members of the Occupy and Québec student movements as examples.

    Honig explains Scarry’s theory of emergency thinking (which we have already covered, so I will only really point to it). She shows that Scarry’s call for deliberative emergency thinking has both instrumental and intrinsic value: instrumental because preparing for an emergency produces a “better survival rate” (4) and intrinsic because this planning by the state shows its concern for the wellbeing for its constituents.

    Honig considers Douglas Crimp’s work in the AIDS crisis (in the US in the 1980s) a model for Activist procedure during times of emergency. She contrasts his method with Scarry’s: “[f]or Crimp, the focus is on acting, not thinking (though of course he is thoughtful)” (6). Crimp’s thoughts create a theory about the value of promiscuity, not deliberation. Honig uses Locke’s theory of “bottoming” to connect the two theorists, which is a bit confusing. Bottoming is basically “mental diligence” (7)—a thorough investigation of an object in order to understand it completely. Locke considers this thoughtfulness the opposite of (mental) promiscuity and this position also suits Scarry’s concept of deliberation. For Crimp, however, bottoming is not contra to promiscuity, because promiscuity is foundational (at the bottom) for the gay community.

    Honig’s third example of democratic response to emergency is Luis F. Post’s actions during the First Red Scare. The First Red Scare took place in the U.S. in the beginning of the 20th century; it refers to a governement crack down on all things socialist and anarchist and resulted in mass deportations. Post, as Assistant Secretary of Labor, used democratic procedure to limit the number of deportations as much as possible. Honig argues that in a way, Post’s proceduralism is a combination of Scarry’s deliberation and Crimp’s activism. By strictly adhering to American law, a plan created before the time of crisis, Post is following the deliberative model. However, Post did not abide American cultural law, and he affiliated with the co-called enemy, socialists and anarchists. (Indeed, he was buds with Emma Goldman before he had to deport her.) In this sense, he was promiscuous in his action during the emergency. Post was undiscriminating, in that practised “the equal treatment of powerful and powerless” (13).

    However, Honig argues that Post’s actions are not simply a combination of Scarry’s and Crimp’s procedure. When Post was forced to defend exploiting the law to the advantage of detainees, he appealed not only to the law but to “a host of other values, such as Americanism, humaneness, and justice” (18). In doing so, he used standards (of justice, etc) that were not yet in place. The source of these new ‘laws’ was himself—Post spoke of how signing deportation slips threatened his conscience. This is perfectly democratic—it is the creation of politics based on the individual’s experience. Honig explains that “[p]ersonal integrity and conscience staged the question of democratic integrity and principle” (19) and therefore created a new model of emergency politics.

    Honig uses the “paradox of politics” to elucidate the primary concern of all three models of emergency politics. The paradox of politics (according to Rousseau) is how do we escape the cycle of needing good people to create and implement good political theory when good political theory is necessary for creating good people? Honig argues that this question is not only relevant at the birth of a society, but also when “new citizens are born into a regime, or immigrate into it, and old ones are re-socialized into its expectations, norms, and demands…[i]t is aggravated in moments of emergency” (22). Times of crises not only challenge our safety, they challenge our identity. These three forms emergency politics are all aware of this, and are concerned with not only surviving a crisis, but with who the survivors will become according to the way they survived.


    I think Honig has something here—these are all excellent models for democratic responses to emergency. However, I find promiscuity a tenuous frame. I think she is overemphasizing the specific action Crimp advocated for, rather than discussing the fact that he advocated for activism, which is in itself widespread and participatory. While Crimp subverts the idea of promiscuity, he retains the meaning of commitment to one’s values. Further, there is difference between promiscuity and indiscrimination—at least in their connotations–and Post’s actions were not really promiscuous (as far as we know) but indiscriminating. (He did not sleep with everyone, he treated them equally and justly.) I think it might be more effective to frame Scarry and Crimp according to the explicit meaning of the names of their politics. Scarry privileges thought over action (actions are habits which simply follow from thought) and it seems Crimpy does the reverse: he advocates for acting in according to values that are already established and do not require scrutiny or deliberation. Both have proven themselves as democratic and effective.

    I really like that in her concluding remarks, Honig connects a theoretical discourse on democracy to the physically lived experience of food. (Although it would have been helpful if she gave a quick definition of the sense in which she was biopolitics, a widely appropriated term.) She also gives an admirable defense to the position that democracy is inefficient—it is only footnoted on the second last page, and perhaps should be more prominently featured.

    (Also, I noticed a few little typos while I was reading: there is a comma error on page 20, Scarry’s name is misspelled somewhere, and the 1980s only need an apostrophe if they possess something.)

  24. Parker English:

    ‘Kwasi Wired has maintained that John Mbiti’s discussion of a traditional African concept of time is “philosophically the most interesting chapter”’

    Mbiti maintains this discussion is “no more than a pioneer attempt which calls for further research and discussion”

    Mbiti believes the traditional African concept of time to be “two-dimensional.”

    Kalumba believes the summary grounds this concept on one of Mbiti’s derivative claims, not one of his primary claims.

    Kalumba’s empirical thesis : “Time has to be experienced in order to make sense or to become real… since what is the future has not been experienced, it does not make sense; it cannot, therefore, constitute part of time, and people do not know how to think about it – unless, of course, it is something which falls within the rhythm of natural phenomena.”

    -We have to experience time in order for us to make sense of it and for it to be considered real for us. Since the future has yet to be experienced, it is not considered to be a part of time, and we can change and alter our futures one step at a time, fantasizing about different outcomes and making necessary changes to what we think is best and strive to make that future a reality in time.

    Mbiti believes things falling within natural rhythms are “certain to occur” ex. The seasons

    – We know that after summer comes fall, then winter, spring and summer again. It is naturally reoccurring.

    Mbiti thinks things that are “certain to occur” are “ in the category of inevitable or potential time… the most significant consequence of this is that, according to traditional concepts, time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future.”

    – the past is made up of many different moments of the present – the future does not therefore exist because once we have experienced the “future” it is the present and then moves into moments of the past, therefore, the “future” is not real or a part of time.

    Two reasons why Mbiti believes traditional Africans have a two-dimensional concept of time:

    1. “…time must be experienced to become real for these people.”
    2. “…only the past and the present have been experienced by anyone”

    (no one can experience the future because it has not happened yet)

    Kalumba now believes Mbiti’s two dimensional view can be derived from two premises which do not solely involve the empirical thesis:

    1. ontological thesis: “… is explicitly presented by Mbiti: ‘time is simply a composition of events which have occurred, those which are taking place now and those which are inevitably or immediately to occur’”

    2. Event thesis: “… it is ‘a necessary step’ in using the ontological thesis to derive the two-dimensional concept of time: ‘ events must be experienced to be actual.’”

    – empirical thesis can be made out of a combination of the ontological thesis and the event thesis

    “The reasons why traditional African time must be experienced to be real, for Mbiti, are such time is composed of events, and events must be experienced to be real.”

    Interest thesis – traditional Africans can have thoughts on the future, “active interest in events that lie in the future…within the horizon of what constitutes actual time.”

    – future events are not a part of time because they have not been experienced, even if we are interested in them

    Mbiti also describes any future that is possible in time as “potential” and not actual. The seasons, for example would still only constitute as potential time and not actual time.

    Mbiti believes this explanation removes any conflict between the empirical thesis and the interest thesis. However, Mbiti also believes that the near-future is a part of actual time instead of potential time. “The future is virtually non-existent as actual time, apart from the relatively short projection of the present up to two years hence [or up to what is ‘inevitable’]”

    Kalumba and English then came to the conclusion that “potential time” is real with respect to what is “inevitable” in the way of “natural cycles”

    Kalumba denies Mbiti’s views of traditional African time in that it can not ..“be explicated via potential time as real/actual with respect to anything.” Kalumba’s reasoning for this, is that Mbiti, at times, distinguishes quite clearly, actual time and potential time. Ex. “ Mbiti thinks future events which are inevitable ‘constitute only potential time, not actual time’”.

    English believes that Mbiti is sometimes clear on his philosophical beliefs and sometimes not, and says that we are now left with a 3-dinentional concept of traditional African time, much like Western time, only the Western concept of time has a future that extends much future than that of the African future.

    “According to Mbiti, then, traditional Africans regard the next two years with significantly more interest than the years beyond.”

    Kalumba and Mbiti both believe that traditional Africans think a cycle of events, like the seasons will “continue forever”

    So Mbiti’s theory of traditional African’s concept of time seems wrong when saying “if the event is remote, say beyond two years from now, then it cannot be conceived”

    Mbiti also believes that traditional Africans “…seem to conceive of a remote-future while having no active interest in it.”

    “Westerners conceive of a remote-future while, typically, having less interest in it than in the near-future.”

    “traditional Africans have a three-dimensional concept of time, more or less as do contemporary Westerners, in which the past is distinguished from the present, and each of these from the future,
    whether near or remote.”

    Mbiti believes that the traditional African concept of time, leads to “‘no’ belief in progress.”

    “The people neither plan for the future nor ‘build castles in the air’. This claim invites scrutiny by those interested in Mbiti’s discussion.”

  25. In this piece Parker English discusses John Mbiti’s concepts of traditional African concepts of time, he begins with referencing back to Mbiti’s original work stating that to Mbiti there exists a two-dimensional concept of time. The first concept described by Mbiti and coined by Kalumba as the empirical thesis is constructed that in the Traditional African sense
    Empirical Thesis
    – “Time has to be experienced in order to make sense or to become real … Since what is the future has not been experienced, it does not make sense; it cannot, therefore, constitute part of time, and people do not know how to think about it—unless, of course, it is something which falls within the rhythm of natural phenomena.”

    Mbiti expands further to include the concept of inevitable time, to account for the natural rhythms of time which can be expected to occur in the future. For example, seasons are certain to occur and therefore all within the idea of inevitable time.

    – This however can only be thought to occur in the near future, and cannot account for the everlasting future of time.

    This is where the second dimension of Mbiti’s traditional concept of African time is developed, if only the past and present have been experienced, then the future doesn’t exist (outside of inevitable time).

    Kalumba brings to discussion two theses in addition to the empirical thesis.

    1. Ontological Thesis
    – Time is simply a composition of events which have occurred, those which are taking place now and those which are inevitable or immediately to occur (inevitable time).
    2. Event Thesis
    – Events must be experienced to be actual.

    These concepts work to illustrate that in the traditional African sense the future is a potential at best, rather than an actuality as a given in a western sense. Mbiti according to English is quick to acknowledge to concept of inevitable time, or occurrences in the future which have a strong potential of happening, IE seasons or sunrise and set (What Sean Carroll would describe as repetitious time, used to measure time). Mbiti seems to contradict himself a bit when he makes a claim that the future exists in a “relatively short projection of the present up to two years”. I think it this made the concept of time in the traditional African sense more confusing as I would have considered this part of inevitable or potential time.
    Parker and Kalumba seem to think that Mbiti is unsuccessful in describing two-dimensional time, rather he only describes three-dimensional time but with a caveat relative to the traditional African concept in which the future of up to two years are more important than beyond that. I agree that by including this Mbiti has added an additional dimension, however I think it’s not what Parker and Kalumba describe but rather in a more general sense with relation to natural rhythms which act as a relative constant (as much as a constant can exist) such as seasons, day-to-night, but doesn’t include the humanistic future, for example elections, war, or general prosperity.

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